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In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God . . . And the 
Word became flesh, and dwelt among us. 
 
John 1:1,14 
 
 
There is, however, an idea that is not Greek which . . . prevented the forgetfulness of language in 
Western thought from being complete.  
This is the Christian idea of incarnation. 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates Gadamer’s statement that Trinitarian theology relieves western 
thought from the forgetfulness of language that arguably began when Plato’s Cratylus depicted 
words as signs that represent truth and continued with logical positivism, which severed the 
word from history and culture. I will show that the new dimension that Trinitarian thought 
offers hermeneutics is the inner word as a movement from act to act, rather than potency to 
act. In the Trinitarian relation, the Word proceeds not after the Father understands, but 
proceeds simultaneously with the act of divine intellection, such that there is no divine 
understanding without divine saying. A movement from potency to act, as one finds in 
Platonism, would suggest that a concept is formed in an immediate sense and then we speak 
the word. This would mean that we can see the thing without the word and thus thought would 
not be historical but a pure act of intellection, divisible from language and history. I argue with 
Gadamer that the Trinitarian notion of the inner word as a procession from act to act has 
awakened hermeneutics to the way in which all thought is historical, in showing us that we 
always already understand what we speak. 
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Introduction 
 
Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that the world arises for us as a meaningful world because human 
language participates in the world of human understanding and experience. The world is 
meaningful because it is handed down to us in a form of conversation or dialogue, in so far as 
language gathers the world together and constitutes both ourselves and our fundamental way 
of understanding. In fact, Gadamer argues that language is so intertwined with our mode of 
understanding that it is essentially indivisible for the insight from which it proceeds, such that 
the words that break forth in speech and pass through the ages remain connected to the 
persons and insights being revealed. In Gadamer’s mind, the relation of insight and word 
highlights the capacity of language to bring the world to us. Gadamer illustrates this indivisible 
bond between insight and word through the Medieval-Trinitarian doctrine of the verbum 
interius, or the inner word of the heart. 
In this thesis, I will examine the implications of the theological verbum interius for 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics. This theological phrase, which Gadamer discusses in ten pages of the 
third part of his masterpiece, Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method), refers to a theological 
teaching which compares human thought to the Incarnation, in which the Word became flesh. 
The verbum interius was developed into an analogy by Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas 
who invoked the procession of the inner word of the heart to elucidate the Father-Son 
procession implicit behind Christian Incarnation. As the Son proceeds from the Father’s 
intellect in act, so also the inner word of human thought proceeds from the intellect in act. As 
the Son remains consubstantial with the Father, the fullness of God in flesh, so also human 
language is the fullness of understanding, the act that speaks insight. The identity of thought 
and word, as accomplished by Trinitarian-Incarnation theology, reminds hermeneutists that 
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the world of experience that breaks forth from the word is not alienated from human 
understanding but is part of the interdependence of language, person, and world. In this thesis, 
I will highlight what Gadamer saw in theology that penetrates our secular conception of the 
word, why the theological verbum matters for philosophical hermeneutics, and what issues in 
the history of philosophy are addressed in this central mystery of the Incarnation and the 
divine procession. 
This thesis provides a careful examination of Gadamer’s commentary on Augustine, 
particularly Augustine’s De Trinitate. As I interpret its meaning, I invoke the commentary of 
Gadamer’s best theological interpreter, John Arthos. It is fair to say that Arthos’s 2009 book, 
The Inner Word in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, sets a high standard for the future of Gadamer’s 
theological interpretations. Much commentary on Gadamer has overlooked the deep 
significance of the verbum interius. In response, Arthos argues that the verbum interius is not a 
mere example or analogy for the primacy of language, but that it goes deeper, since the Church 
is the image and unfolding of the divine word.2 In this sense that the word is fused with the 
community, Arthos maintains that world history can be understood as the continuation of the 
word and the furtherance of the meaning that carries us through the ages.3 This thesis will 
appropriate Arthos’s insights into what it means for the Christian word to be a growth and 
manifestation of truth.  
I have divided this thesis into three chapters. The first chapter discusses the verbum 
interius and the historical and linguistic nature of human thought. The second chapter 
discusses Augustine’s contribution to the verbum interius as a word that says or appears. 
                                                          
2 John Arthos, The Inner Word in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2009), 2-3.  
3Ibid., 12.  
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 The third chapter of this thesis takes up the interdependence of thought and speech in the 
Incarnation as the manifestation of a tradition already full of meaning.  
 
Verbum Interius: The Mirror and Image of the Divine Word 
 
Gadamer teaches that the lingual, hermeneutical experience, in which all human experience 
and thought is linguistically mediated, finds its way in and out of Trinitarian theology. Long 
before Gadamer or the Christian-Medieval philosopher, the writer of the Gospel of John in his 
contemplation of the revelation of the Son in his Incarnation fused together truth, word, and 
life, when he identified the Son, not in abstract, theoretical terms, as a name which cannot be 
spoken but rather as logos, “God’s self-manifestation in language”4: “In the beginning was the 
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God . . . The Word became flesh and 
made his dwelling among us.”5 That God is embodied in flesh without loss of his divinity is 
“strangely different” 6 from the embodiment of the Greek gods and thereby challenges our 
western tendency to severe truth and word from history and culture.7 In the person of Christ, 
word is identified with person; concept takes on historical shape. This theological transposition 
of word with being, as Gadamer’s theological interpreter John Arthos phrases it, directs 
language away from a “bloodless conceptual abstraction” of truth and emphasises word as 
truth fused with flesh and history.8 The lingual structure of the person elevates language with 
                                                          
4 Andrzej Wiercinski, “The Hermeneutical Retrieval of a Theological Insight: The Verbum Interius,” in Between 
the Human and the Divine (Toronto: International Institute for Hermeneutics, 2002), 14. 
5 John 1:1.14, New International Version. 
6 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimier and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd Revised 
Edition (London: Continuum International Publishing, 2012), 419, cited in Arthos 2. 
7 Arthos, 2. 
8 Ibid. 
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hermeneutics, which is to say that all human understanding and experience resides within the 
continual utterance of the word embodied in historical community. 
Gadamer examines human utterance as a participation in the divine utterance, one that 
encompasses the structure of thought and penetrates our secular conception of language. The 
Church Fathers, in an attempt to interpret the likeness between God and humanity as 
portrayed in Scripture, contemplated the depth of the human soul, which was believed to be 
made in God’s image. In light of John’s prologue, human thought and utterance was understood 
as the image of God’s Word. The Fathers studied this image as it provided an understanding of 
what it means for the Word to became flesh. “God has given [the human being] a share in His 
own image,” Athanasius writes in De Incarnatione, “in order that through this gift of God-
likeness in themselves they may be able to perceive the Image Absolute, that is the Word 
Himself, and through Him to apprehend the Father.”9 In his contemplation of this God-image, 
Augustine discovered triads that suggested that the soul is the imago Dei, made in the likeness 
of the Trinity.10 Aquinas found the divine procession in the structure of human thought, 
insisting that the procession of the inner word from human insight resembles the procession of 
the Son from the Father: “[Divine procession] is to be understood . . . of the intelligible word 
which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him.”11 As Arthos points out so succinctly, the 
course of thought that stimulated these insights into the human soul provided the fertile 
ground for a hermeneutical understanding of word as fused with thought and history.12 Just as 
Trinitarian theology led Augustine and Aquinas to understand the procession of the human 
                                                          
9 Athanasius, De Incarnatione, tran. A Religious of C.S.M.V. (Creswood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 
1944), 3.11. 
10 Arthos, 70-71. I use Arthos’s sentence structure. 
11 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2nd, rev. ed., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1920; 
New Advent, 2008): 1. a, q. 27, a. 1. http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2001.htm. Arthos does not reference 
this passage or insight on page 71, but he does reference Aquinas. 
12 Arthos, 72. 
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word, their insights would later awake Hegel to the relational structure of the “I,” Heidegger to 
his “hermeneutics of facticity, and Gadamer to an ontology of language.”13 We must turn to 
Trinitarian theology in order to understand the roots of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 
 Trinitarian theology provides a model that shows us that truth and meaning reside 
within the word that passes through us. Gadamer argues that most of the history of philosophy, 
with the exception of Trinitarian theology, has in some degree or another taught that word and 
concept are separate. The word, in this common thinking, is an instrument that guides our way 
to knowledge but itself does not show or speak truth. In Gadamer’s reading of Church history, 
the Church Fathers and Scholastics provide a counter argument to the instrumentalisation of 
the word, because the imago Dei, when taken to its conclusion, means that there is no act of 
intellect divorced from the word, and that the word has an essential relation to truth, as a 
testimony of the concept.14 The Fathers arrive at an understanding of an identity of word and 
truth through a contemplation of the kindship between divine procession and human 
utterance, with the understanding that the divine Word is not a separate being from the Father 
but the full embodiment of his understanding. The Son is the uttered Word of the Father’s 
mind, not an instrument that guides the Father to understanding, but that in which the Father 
understands himself, such that the Word is intrinsic to the knowing of the Father. In light of the 
divine revelation, the Fathers are able to understand that the human word proceeds from 
thought in this similar manner as the divine procession. As the Father understands through the 
Word, so human understanding is made intelligible through the inner word. This kindship 
between divine procession and human language establishes language as fused with insight, 
because the nature of a Trinitarian structure, which is to say the unity of the Father’s mind and 
                                                          
13 Ibid.  
14 Arthos refers to the word as the “living realization” of the concept, 301. 
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the uttered Word, means that insight cannot be severed from the word that speaks it. The inner 
word is not a sign or copy of prior meaning, which one attaches onto an object but is the 
enactment of thought, which bodies forth into the world. 
Trinitarian theology provides a relief from what Gadamer calls the forgetfulness of 
language that in his interpretation began when Plato and Greek metaphysics denied that the 
word manifests and brings forth the fullness of meaning. In Gadamer’s reading, Plato 
compounds the forgetfulness of language because he depicts language as a representation of 
truth or a lens by which we see truth and thus forgets that the word bears truth. For instance, 
Plato’s Cratylus is a dialogue that portrays words in terms of signs derived from social 
convention and their natural agreement with their objects. In contrast, Gadamer argues, “all 
this misses the point that the truth of things resides in discourse – which means, ultimately, in 
intending a unitary meaning concerning things – and not in the individual words, not even in a 
language’s entire stock of words.”15 Gadamer returns hermeneutics to the Christian revelation 
of the word as fused with the truth of things. That the Word remains within the Father teaches 
hermeneutics that the word is the fullness of human understanding, and that our encounter 
with the word is made meaningful through the conversation in our community and culture. The 
word is transformed under Trinitarian theology because the identity of insight and word 
means that the word is not a lens through which we see truth but the dynamic that enfolds our 
very being. 
Gadamer turns to Augustine’s analogy of the verbum interius as the pivotal point that 
brings us to the word which unfolds human understanding. Gadamer repeated at the end of his 
life that Augustine was central to his thought16: “I myself relied on Augustine’s . . . teaching of 
                                                          
15 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 412. 
16 Arthos, 98. 
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the ‘inner word.’”17 Augustine himself, however, never broke through the surface to the 
remembrance of language, although he was nearing it towards the end of his career when he 
wrote De Trinitate. The irony of Gadamer’s turn to Augustine is compounded by the fact that 
Augustine had a Platonist education. In fact, it was arguably because of his Platonism that 
Augustine failed to recognise that human understanding is always already mediated by history 
and culture. According to Augustine, we have immediate access to what is real and true and 
then express it in language. Thus, for Augustine, we transition from not understanding to 
understanding, or from an act that sees the real to later expressing that insight. Thus, for 
Augustine, we have a first act of understanding. Gadamer undoes this. For Gadamer we always 
already understand, because we speak the word which has passed through us. The reason 
Gadamer underplays Augustine’s Platonism is that he wants to argue for Augustine’s 
Trinitarian theology and make a non-Augustinian point, namely that all thought is historical, 
because the word speaks the mind, in the same way that Son speaks the Father’s intellect in act. 
In seeking to understand the Triune God, it is revealed to Augustine a supreme likeness 
between the divine word and the human word. What follows from Augustine’s analogy is a 
conversation that passes among the Fathers to the Scholastics all the way to Heidegger and 
Gadamer, in which the historical and lingual nature of thought comes to light. Gadamer kept 
returning to Augustine in his case for hermeneutics, since we stand within the Augustinian 
tradition.  
Trinitarian theology reveals the inner word as a movement from act to act, as opposed 
to potency to act, and it is this Trinitarian insight that captures Gadamer’s attention. In bringing 
Augustine’s analogy to its fullest conclusion, Aquinas showed the hermeneutical relation of 
                                                          
17 Gadamer, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ritual and Language,” in Language and Linguisticality in 
Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, edit. Lawrence Schmidt (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2000), 33. 
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mind and word as one of procession, the emergence of an act of language from an act of 
understanding.18 In the godhead, the act of divine utterance emerges directly from the act of 
the Father understanding himself, as the manifestation of the Father’s intellect in act. The act of 
divine utterance emerges directly from the Father’s intellect in act, because God’s knowing is 
immediate and direct. Thus, for the Father to see and understand is to speak the Word, as 
Aquinas writes, “God by one act understands Himself and all things.”19 Because the Father is 
never without the Word (the Son is eternally begotten), the divine procession is a procession 
from act to act, as opposed to a movement from potency to act. A movement from potency to 
act would mean that the Father transitions from sight to speaking a word, and this in 
Gadamer’s interpretation would lead to the rationalist and dualist belief that we can 
understand in a pure act of intellect without language and our situation in history. The 
revelation of Trinity suggests, on the contrary, that to understand is to speak a word, because 
the Father understands himself in speaking the Word. 
The importance of the procession of act to act for hermeneutics is that it shows that a 
concept is not formulated outside language and then transposed into word, but that the 
concept is enacted through the word that passes through us and is fused with the insight of the 
world in which we are enveloped. The word is not a movement from potency to act, an 
understanding without saying, but a movement from act to act, an understanding in saying. The 
human mind may be discursive and finite, compared to God’s perfected knowing. Yet in the 
moment in which we proclaim “I understand,” a word emerges, much like the way in which the 
Word emerges in the godhead. Human language is not a movement from sight to word, but the 
                                                          
18 Wiercinski, 21. This definition of potency originally derives from Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and 
Idea in Aquinas, edit. David Burrel (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 107. I use the 
structure of Lonergan’s definition in order to preserve the meaning. 
19 Aquinas, ST, 1. a, q. 34, a. 3. 
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utterance and manifestation of human understanding. Gadamer summarises the scholastic 
contribution to human language this way: “the word is not formed only after the act of intellect 
has been completed . . . it is the act of knowledge itself.”20 The word says or speaks the insight, 
as the manifestation of it, and all thought is historical because it expresses itself in the word 
that has carried us. 
Theological hermeneutics and philosophical hermeneutics share an understanding of 
human life as a participation in what Gadamer calls “the conversation that we are.” Drawing 
upon Christian theology and Heidegger’s philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer argues that we 
understand, not in hovering above objects, but in speaking and standing within the culture. The 
word unfolds dynamically in a mode of conversation, in so far as it brings together the past and 
present into a kind of conversation which passes through ages in and through the language: “It 
is true that the historical ‘worlds’ that succeed one another in the course of history are different 
from one another and from the world of today; but in whatever tradition we consider it, it is 
always a human – i.e. verbally constituted – world that presents itself to us. As verbally 
constituted, every such world is of itself always open to every possible insight and hence to 
every expansion of its own world picture, and is accordingly available to others.”21 The word is 
the horizon through which insight occurs, as the condition of the possibility of understanding. 
All thought is intrinsically historical, as the language that makes thought possible has a 
historical context, and the word is a manifestation of a historical insight already present with 
us. This brings us back to the fact that the word is not a transition from potentiality into 
actuality, because the word does not work its way into actuality but works from something 
already mediated by the culture.22 In affirming this, Gadamer says, “What is said in [language] 
                                                          
20 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 423. 
21 Ibid., 444.  
22 Arthos, 301. 
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constitutes the common world in which we live and to which belongs also the whole great 
chain of tradition reaching us from the literature of foreign languages, living as well as dead. 
The real being of language is that into which we are taken up when we hear it – what is said.”23 
 
“More than a Mere Metaphor” 
 
In a 1988 Heidelberg conversation with his long-time friend and Canadian biographer Jean 
Grondin, Gadamer relayed in private the hermeneutical significance of verbum interius and 
made it clear that verbum interius is not a casual analogy for human language but historically 
stands as the central key to hermeneutics claim of universality, that is, the claim that all human 
experience and thought is the embodiment of historical understanding.24 In a point often 
passed over too quickly in much Gadamerian scholarship but brought to our attention by 
Arthos,25 Gadamer insists that the verbum interius “is more than a mere metaphor.”26 Gadamer 
grounds the universality of hermeneutics in a tradition that designates the relation between 
the divine word and the human word as one of participation.27 The relation between the divine 
word and the human word is not a metaphorical likeness but an analogy that denotes a literal, 
causal relationship. In other words, the Church Fathers do not compare two relations that have 
little connection, as for example, when someone links human life and theme parks in the 
popular metaphor “life is a rollercoaster” but rather invoke two words that share something in 
                                                          
23 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. and edit. David E. Linge (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1976), 65. 
24 Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, tran. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994), XIV. Grondin writes, “In a formulaic and unsophisticated way, I asked [Gadamer] to 
explain more exactly what the universal aspect of hermeneutics consisted in. After everything that I had read, 
I was prepared for a long and rather vague answer. He thought the matter over and answered, concisely and 
conclusively, thus, “In the verbum interius.” 
25 Arthos, 2–3, 250.  
26 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 420.  
27 Arthos, 250.  
 
16 
 
common.28 As Arthos has shown, Gadamer is keen to note this kindship. “Divine persons and 
the process of thought really have something in common.”29 “Exegesis interprets the speaking of 
the word to be as miraculous as the Incarnation of God.”30 “The inner mental word is just as 
consubstantial with thought as is God the Son with God the Father.”31  
 There is a literal, causal relation between the divine word and the human word, and it is 
this link that Gadamer argues moves us away from the obsession with what he calls the 
“ideality of meaning,”32 which is to say, “the unfortunate Greek idea” that the word serves to 
denote a truth, while remaining separate and removed from that truth.33 The Trinitarian 
relations, in which the Word expresses the Father’s mind by his very identity with him, is a 
model that reminds us that the word is fused with the insight that it expresses and thus the 
word is not a mere sign but the manifestation and saying of the thing. The intrinsic likeness 
between the divine word and the human word establishes the fact that the word completes 
thought in a moment of understanding. Human consciousness is historical, because its thought 
is not formed in a pure act of the intellect but is enacted in the word that has carried the 
community. If at any point we begin to speak of the relation between the divine word and the 
human word as a mere analogy, we lose something of what Gadamer and the Church Fathers 
are really saying: the word is the manifestation of the truth of things, in a manner analogous to 
the way in which the Son is the manifestation of the Father’s intellect in act.  
It is important to understand how deeply the word as the saying of the thing penetrates 
Christian theology. The verbum interius was not an analogy a couple of men happened upon but 
                                                          
28 Ibid, 3, 250. 
29 Gadamer, 423, emphasis mine. 
30 Ibid., 419, cited in Arthos, 3. 
31 Ibid, 420. 
32 Ibid., 417. 
33Arthos, 226-227. 
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was the conclusion of the divine revelation, which was revealed to the Apostles, but passed 
along to the Fathers and Scholastics. Theophilus of Antioch remembered language in writing an 
account of creation. He sought to understand how the Father utters the Word and converses 
with his Word and was led to the conclusion that divine utterance is much like the word which 
we speak, which is externalised but remains within the intellect.  
To externalize the word in the heart is not to lose the word that has been 
spoken: for the divine scripture itself teaches us that Adam said that he ‘heard 
the voice’ . . . What is this ‘voice’ but . . . the Logos, always innate in the heart of 
God . . . When God wish to make what he had planned to make, he generated this 
Logos, making him external, as the firstborn of all creation. He did not deprive 
himself of the Logos but generated the Logos and constantly converses with his 
Logos.”34 
 
Theophilus may be who Gadamer had in mind when he wrote that “the early Fathers used the 
miracle of language to explain the un-Greek idea of creation.”35 At any rate, what is clear is that 
for both Gadamer and Theophilus there is something deeper going on here than a “mere 
metaphor.” The Son reveals something about language, which we can understand from multiple 
angles, but “from within doctrine” being the point. There is a common theme in the speaking of 
the word in the Incarnation and the speaking of word in creation, because in both the Word 
does not “consist in separating one thing from other . . . nor in becoming something different.”36 
In creation and in the Incarnation the Father’s understanding is shown forth and made visible 
in his Son. The Son is the fullness of the Father’s understanding. He speaks the Father’s mind. 
As Arthos points out, it is because the Son is the fullness of the Father that the Church 
Fathers kept returning to the fact that the procession of the Son is not a loss.37 Athanasius 
                                                          
34 Theophilus of Antioch. Ad Autolycum trans. Robert M. Grant (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), II. 22, cited in 
Arthos 246. I am using his research. 
35 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 419. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Arthos, 246. 
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writes, “A son is a father’s increase, not acquisition.”38 Hilary of Poitiers confers, “There was not 
imperfect separation but a perfect begetting, for the birth does not lead to any loss on the part 
of the begetter, while it includes a gain for the one who is born.”39 Justin Martyr brought divine 
procession full circle to hermeneutics, when he said that the word is like a fire which grows  
meaning:  
When we speak any word, we beget that word; but not by separating it from us, 
so as to diminish the word that is in us, by our speaking it. Just as we see also 
that one fire is lighted from another without diminishing that which is lighted 
from, that still continuing to be the same; and which is lighted does really exist, 
but does not diminish that from which it was lighted.40 
 
The question of course is why does Trinitarian theology reveal this truth of language, but other 
competing philosophies do not? If one thing is clear, at least for Gadamer, we cannot 
understand divine revelation without approaching it from within theology.  
 
The Historical Nature of the Verbum 
 
Gadamer turns to the verbum interius because its confirmation that all thought is historical 
upends the hierarchy of scientific empiricism that has undermined the humanities and 
demoted the study of history to a lesser, secondary truth compared to the natural sciences. 
That language constitutes our fundamental mode of being confirms Gadamer’s thesis that 
tradition is the enactment of human understanding, as the language that makes thought 
possible is already mediated by the tradition and culture around us. In particular, the 
                                                          
38 Athanasius, “In Defence of the Nicene Definition of the Homousion,” 3.16, in Select Treatises of St. 
Athanasius, 25, cited in Arthos, 247. My reading is indebted to Arthos’s research and commentary. 
39 Hilary of Poitiers. The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1966), 7.11, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2nd ser., vol 4 (New York: Christian Literature Company, 
1982), cited in Arthos, 245-246. 
40 Justin Martyr, Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, trans. Henry Brown (Cambridge: McMullin, 
1846), LXI, cited in Arthos, 246. 
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distortions of logical positivism in the twentieth century had reduced truth to that which was 
supposedly empirically verifiable from a neutral zone, free of presuppositions, concealing the 
historical nature of the word that makes thought possible. In contrast to a positivist 
methodology in which the knower is the centre and all else is her object which she peels back 
under the technique of an objective, mathematical model, 41 Trinitarian theology suggests that 
we understand because the world is mediated by history and tradition. Human knowledge does 
not begin with an act of intellect that sees a truth in an immediate sense, aided only by 
scientific methodology, but grows from an immersion in a truth that resides in discourse and 
passes through us in the word. 
Gadamer invokes the verbum interius in order to offer an alternative to logical 
positivism and Romanticism. In particular, logical positivism had reduced truth to the 
empirically given and so regarded the human sciences, such as history, philosophy, and 
literature, as not dealing with truth, since these discourses do not correspond to empirical 
realities and do not conform to methodological verification. This same pressure led Dilthey to 
draw a distinction between the natural sciences that testify to the empirically given and the 
human sciences, which disclose the historical understanding of the human being. Gadamer is 
unsatisfied with this solution, because it continues to restrict truth to the natural sciences and 
to verifiable methodology and consign the humanities to the realm of non-truth and mere 
aesthetic appreciation. In Romanticism, the pressures of the natural sciences concealed the way 
that truth speaks to the human being and human sciences, by reducing the word to aesthetic 
appreciation. The emphasis towards the inner life nurtured the aesthetics of genius, 
emphasising the creative aspect of the human person, which was a genuine breath of fresh air 
                                                          
41 Ingrid Scheibler, Gadamer between Heidegger and Habermas (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
2000), 137.  I use her sentence structure. 
 
20 
 
in an age of rationalism, but this emphasis on the genius often concealed the artwork’s claim on 
us, which addresses us in its own terms, revealing its truth to us. Gadamer does not want to 
lessen the creative role of the human being, but he also recognises that a compulsive emphasis 
on the aesthetic genius can conceal the event of the artwork that speaks to us within 
tradition.42  
The verbum interius brings us back to the historical nature of the thought that 
revitalises the human sciences as a source of knowledge. The Christian word reminds us that 
the word is an event that unfolds through the human sciences. The word is not a movement 
from potency to act (sight to word) but a movement from act to act (understanding in saying), 
and thus there is no sight without the word and text that carries us. We do not see apart from 
language and history but through it: “Historical consciousness . . . adopts a reflective posture 
toward both itself and the tradition in which it is situated. It understands itself in terms of its 
own history.”43 What Gadamer is saying is that it is in belonging to tradition that truth is 
disclosed. The interdependence of thought and word reminds us that all thought is historical 
and that history and tradition are the very “enactment of understanding.”44 The human 
sciences are not a mere aesthetic feeling or second-class truth but are part of this living 
tradition that enacts human understanding. In affirming this, Gadamer says: “What has come 
down to us by way of verbal tradition is not left over but given to us, told us – whether through 
direct retelling, in which myth, legend, and custom have their life, or through written tradition, 
whose signs are, as it were, immediately clear to every reader who can read them.”45 
                                                          
42 Jens Zimmermann, Humanism and Religion: A Call for Renewal of Western Culture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 262. For further reading on the issue of Gadamer’s address to German Idealism, the 
Enlightenment, and German Romantism, see Zimmermann’s entire chapter on Gadamer, 230-268. 
43 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 228. Italics in the original. 
44 Zimmermann, 241. 
45 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 391. 
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Verbum Interius: Where We Go from Here 
 
Gadamer has said that there is never a last word in a matter of understanding.46 My effort here 
is to partake of the historical conversation on the verbum interius. In an attempt to understand 
the influence of the Christian word, Gadamer provides an exegesis of Augustine’s De Trinitiate 
and the Thomistic De Natura Verbi Intellectus, albeit in pieces that weave through his own 
hermeneutical presuppositions and commentary. Gadamer’s explication contains insight into 
the implications of the Christian verbum for our secular understanding of language, and it 
invokes this word as a return to a hermeneutical understanding of the human being embedded 
in the world of history and culture. But Augustine’s and Aquinas’s text are dense, Gadamer’s 
commentary is brief, and there is always more that needs be said. My hope is that a discussion 
of these theological insights will elucidate just why, for Gadamer, the word is not an instrument 
but carries what is meaningful, passing through human conversation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
46 Ibid., 581. 
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1 
The Identity of Thought and Word 
Gadamer, Hermeneutics, and the Lingual Nature of Thought 
 
Gadamer summarised the universality of hermeneutics, a phrase he inherited from Heidegger, 
to denote the fact that all human experience and thought is historical and therefore 
interpretative, as the verbum interius. Aquinas and Augustine formed an analogy between 
human understanding and language in order to understand the Trinity, one that Gadamer 
argues brought to hermeneutics’s attention the identity of thought and word that grounds 
human understanding in interpretation: “We are trying to keep in mind the indissoluble unity 
of thought and language as we encounter it in the hermeneutical phenomenon, namely as the 
unity of understanding and interpretation.”47 The human word is a taking up of thought, a 
saying of insight, so as to disperse itself across conversations and ancient texts. The word is a 
kind interpretation that enlivens the thoughts and insights from which it proceeds, and thought 
itself is possible because it conceives this word. 
 This chapter has two purposes: first, to situate the verbum interius within Gadamer’s 
argument that human understanding is historical; and second, to situate the lingual and 
historical nature of thought within Gadamer’s greater hermeneutical project to establish the 
validity of the human sciences. My argument here will unfold in three sections. In the first 
section, I will show that the verbum interius establishes the historical and lingual nature of 
consciousness, because the identity of thought and word shows us that we always already 
understand what we speak. In the second section, I will introduce Gadamer’s understanding of 
                                                          
47 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 404. 
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historically effected consciousness, so as to understand the presuppositions that Gadamer 
brings to his discussion of the verbum interius. In the third section, I will demonstrate why 
historical consciousness is essential to Gadamer’s hermeneutical project, namely to show that 
history and literature are part of the very passage of understanding and our encounter with 
truth and thus the human sciences are not a lesser truth to the natural sciences. 
 
 Human Understanding and Interpretation  
  
Gadamer attributes the hermeneutical turn in philosophy to a causal analogy that Aquinas 
uncovers between the divine word and the human word, both of which constitute a procession 
not from potency to act but from act to act. In Gadamer’s interpretation, the relation of 
consciousness and history is built on the fact that we already understand what we speak, 
precisely because the word is not a transition from not understanding to understanding 
(potency to act) but is a procession in which the mind expresses its understanding in the very 
act of language (act to act). Gadamer observes from Aquinas, “The process and emergence of 
thought is not a process of change (motus), not a transition from potentiality into action, but an 
emergence ut actus ex act.”48 Gadamer’s reference to this procession of the human word is 
found in the Thomistic De Natura Verbum Intellectus: “There are not two movements from 
potentiality towards actuality, because the intellect has already been made actual through the 
idea; rather it is a complete procession from actuality to actuality.”49 In Gadamer’s 
interpretation, the analogy between the human word and the divine word redirects us to the 
                                                          
48 Ibid. 422. 
49 Aquinas [possibly spurious], De Natura Verbi Intellectus, trans. John Arthos, in The Inner Word in Gadamer’s 
Hermeneutics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), § 275. Thanks to John Arthos for drawing 
this text to my attention and providing a translation at the back of his book. 
 
24 
 
historical nature of thought, because the divine pattern of understanding, in which the Father 
understands in speaking the divine word, is not a transition from not understanding to 
understanding, nor is it a process of seeing and then speaking a word (potency to act). The 
relationship is intimate, as the Son proceeds directly from the Father’s intellect in act (act to 
act). 
The comparison of the inner word and the divine word derives from Augustine’s 
analogy of the inner word. In De Trinitate, Augustine argues that the human word is the imago 
Dei, mirroring God’s understanding. Aquinas develops this linguistic analogy in light of 
Aristotelian philosophy.50 According to Aristotle, the world can be explained in terms of 
potency to act, the emergence of perfection from that which is perfectible.51 If I close my eyes, I 
experience the possibility of physical sight. 52 My eyes represent the material condition 
(physical, chemical, and biological) for the possibility of seeing. “Seeing” is a potential act of 
sight. In contrast, there is no potency or transition in God’s Word. As God is infinite, God is pure 
act, Actus Purus. The absence of potency in the godhead explains why God’s understanding is 
immediate and not discursive. God’s understanding does not work from things known to 
unknown, or vice versa, because God already knows all things and thus there is no transition in 
God. Aquinas says, “God by one act understands Himself and all things.”53 God’s understanding 
is a simple, complete act that is an expression of himself; in this way, God’s understanding is 
identical with his being. 
                                                          
50 Arthos, 300-301. 
51 Lonergan, 107. I use his sentence structure in order to preserve his definition of potency. 
52 Thanks to Michael Shute for helping me clarify this analogy. I am using his language, though the analogy 
derives from Aristotle and Lonergan.  
53 Aquinas, ST, 1. a, q. 34, a. 3.  
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Aquinas argues that the inner word is the imago Dei and thus participates in this 
procession from act to act, 54 in our otherwise state of potency to act.55 The mind proceeds in a 
series of acts of understanding. Human understanding begins with a “preconceptual act,”56 or 
“undefined impression”57 of the object or idea, which Aquinas calls the species of the thing. At 
this stage the species or impression still needs the intellect to turn it into a concept or word, 
but it is already actual and full save its expression in a word or concept.58 In this respect, as 
Arthos says, we are not speaking of potency but of an idea already in the mind and already in 
act. There is a second act that follows this preconceptual act, namely the act of understanding 
that produces the inner word or concept. In an act of understanding, a meaning or truth 
presents itself as a concept or inner word, which refers to that which we now understand. The 
word moves direct from the intellect in act: “The act of the intellection . . . is prior to the word, 
and the word the terminus of the intellect’s act.”59 What this means is that the human word is 
an act that manifests thought in act.  
                                                          
54 In this paragraph, I use the same order and structure of Arthos, 300-301, because the sequence of the acts 
of understanding is important to the meaning of the procession of thought. 
55 Human understanding can be understood as a procession from act to act, which is to say, a movement from 
an act of understanding to a concept or word; this procession, of course, is what interests Gadamer most. Yet 
Aquinas also argues that there is another sense, and perhaps a most prominent sense, that human 
understanding is a movement from potency to act, which is to say, the emergence of perfection in that which 
is being perfected. In Summa Theologiae, Aquinas explains that human understanding is a series of 
incomplete acts, in contrast to divine knowing, in which the Father is a complete act of understanding and the 
Son a complete act of speaking. “We must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a 
state of actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete 
act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the complete act.” In the 
perfection of our ideas, human understanding does in some sense transition from not understanding to 
understanding and in this respect has no analogy to God who knows all things. The emergence of the inner 
word, however, is a procession from act to act, since it moves direct from an act of understanding. Aquinas, 
ST, 1a, q. 85, a.3. These definitions of the emergence of the word and the emergence of perfection is discussed 
by Wiercinski, 21-22, who derives the definitions from Lonergan, 107. Also, thanks to Michael Shute for 
helping me clarify what it means for human understanding to transition from being in potency to act. 
56 Wiercinski, 21. 
57 Lonergan, 107. 
58 Arthos, 301. I use his sentence structure. The next two sentences are also a summary of this page. 
59 Aquinas, De Natura, § 275. 
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Now what Gadamer argues is that this inner procession testifies to the fact that human 
consciousness is a historical consciousness. Partly this historical consciousness has to do with 
the fact that ideas are not formed without acts of sense, because the mind is absorbed in the 
contemplation of the material matter. Here is where Arthos is to the point: before we have fully 
conceptualised the matter in language, the species has already entered the mind, and this 
means, for Gadamer, that thought is shaped by what has already taken place in the mind.60 The 
species emerges in the mind before we speak a word and thus we have a preconceptual act of 
understanding before we have put the experience into words. We do not see the world in a 
neutral vantage point, but in and through the world in which we live. This is why Gadamer 
says: “The word does not emerge in a sphere of the mind that is still free of thought.”61 But this 
is not to imply that we really come to an understanding of something without the word that has 
carried us. There is a fine line here, and one that brings us to Trinitarian thought. The word 
proceeds from thought in a manner analogous to the way in which the Son proceeds from the 
Father’s intellect in act. The way to think of this procession is that the word draws out and 
brings forth the mind, and it is in these moments in which we conceptualise our understanding 
that we realise what we have already understood in a preconceptual sense. “Now, the intellect’s 
first action is the formation of its object (a word) through the idea. Once this is formed, it 
understands.”62 We experience this immediacy in the ‘aha’ moments.63 In the moment of 
understanding, a word appears in which we understand and proclaim, “this is what I was trying 
                                                          
60 Arthos, 301. 
61 Gadamer, 425. 
62 Aquinas, De Natura, § 275. 
63 Arthos, 301. Arthos’s point derives from Lonergan’s work on the “ah” moment. See, for example, Insight: a 
Study into Human Understanding, edit. Fredrick Crowe and Robert Doran (London: Longmans, Green & Com, 
1952). 
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to say.” We understand not apart from the word but in the act of generating concepts out of 
what we already understand.  
 Gadamer’s hermeneutics is rooted in our interpretative mode of being. As such, his 
hermeneutics, following Heidegger, is ontological. We do not understand through a rigorous 
method in which we stand above the object of knowing, but we understand in and through the 
phenomena in which we are immersed.64 “My real concern was and is philosophic,” Gadamer 
says, “not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our 
wanting and doing.”65 Human understanding is the mode of the human experience: 
“Understanding is never a subjective relation to any given ‘object’ but the history of its effect; in 
other words, understanding belongs to the being of that which is understood.”66 Understanding 
occurs when we encounter the world that brings together person, history, and culture in a 
meaningful experience. The mode in which we understand and interpret is indivisible from the 
world in which we inhabit. We stand in the world having interpreted it already, as a kind of 
virtual embodiment of the world that captures us and grasps hold of us in order to reveal itself.   
In Gadamer’s interpretation, the verbum interius is a model that helps us to understand 
this interpretive mode of being, because it brings to light the way in which human 
understanding is consubstantial with language: “The inner mental word is just as 
consubstantial with thought as God the Son with God the Father.”67 In Gadamer’s thinking, 
human understanding is embedded in the world and thus is an interpretive experience, 
precisely because language shapes human experience. We understand the world because the 
world is enfolding within a conversation that passes through the times and in which we 
                                                          
64 Zimmermann, 233-234. 
65 Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxvi. 
66 Ibid., xxviii. 
67 Ibid., 420. 
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participate. Christian thinkers, such as Augustine and Aquinas, were not concerned with this 
philosophical hermeneutic, but Gadamer argues that they brought us to hermeneutics in 
drawing to our attention to the lingual nature of human consciousness and interpretation. The 
model of the Trinitarian relations as an identity of thought with word is not an insignificant 
matter, because it shows us that thought moves directly into a word, such that there is no 
understanding without saying, or perhaps more accurately for Gadamer’s purpose, 
understanding comes about in saying. In this way, the model of the divine procession shows us 
that we are lingual beings. Thought proceeds into the word and to understand is to speak the 
word. In Gadamer’s words, “The word is not formed only after the act of knowledge has been 
completed – in Scholastic terms, after the intellect has been informed by the species; it is the 
act of knowledge itself. Thus the word is simultaneous with this forming (formatio) of the 
intellect.”68 The word is a kind of heuristic that brings forth human thoughts in a moment of 
understanding.  
The lingual structure of thought suggests that all of human experience and 
understanding is interpretative. The word that enlivens human thought encompasses our 
entire being. The word overwhelms our understanding. In language, we stand within a world of 
meaning, which penetrates human experience beyond “our wanting and doing.”69 We do not 
step outside interpretation, since we already exist within the world that we have interpreted 
and understood already. “Hermeneutics,” Gadamer explains, “must start from the position that 
a person seeking to understand something has a bond to the subject matter that comes into 
language.”70 We understand the world because language places us in a position of belonging to 
it, and interpretation is that which arises from the act of understanding that world. 
                                                          
68 Ibid., 423. 
69 Ibid., xxvii. 
70 Ibid., 295. 
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Interpretation is what happens when we understand something; it is the manifestation of 
consciousness in act and thus “understanding and interpretation are indissolubly bound 
together.”71 We always already understand and interpret because we speak the word.  
For Gadamer, the Trinitarian revelation of the verbum interius upends the forgetfulness 
of language that in Gadamer’s interpretation began when Plato’s Cratylus depicted language in 
terms of a signification system that provides words with a “correct” meaning and was 
resurfaced with twentieth century logical positivism and correspondence theories of truth. 
Correspondence theories of truth understand language in terms of representation, while 
forgetting that language exceeds our understanding. The word, in this thinking, is that which 
represents the thing but not that which says and shows us the world on its own terms. In 
Plato’s Cratylus, for instance, the interlocutor Cratylus asserts that a name must represent the 
“true nature” of the person, or the name is useless, failing to correspond to the person. Thus, 
according to Cratylus, it is not useful to speak the name of Socrates’s friend Hermogenes, 
because the name is a disjoint from his nature, since he is not of the race of Hermes. In 
Gadamer’s argument, twentieth century logical positivists followed this forgetfulness of 
language. In positivism, words are said to be signs that match an object, and words that fail to 
correspond to a scientifically verifiable object are considered to be meaningless statements. 
While Cratylus tells Socrates that speaking the name “Hermogenes” is “merely making a noise, 
going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot,”72 the positivist 
Rudolph Carnap says that words that do not correspond to empirical objects “have no sense, 
assert nothing, are mere pseudo-statements.”73 The problem for hermeneutists like Heidegger 
                                                          
71 Ibid., 400. 
72 Plato, Crytatus, trans. Harold North Fowler (London: Heinemann, 1926), 430a. 
73 Rudolph Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language" in Logical 
Positivism, trans. Arthur Pap, ed. A.J. Ayer (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), 67. 
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and Gadamer is that these competing correspondence theories conceal the phenomena of 
world, which unveils itself to us in language. The word is not a correspondence to an object in 
the world but rather the condition of the possibility of a world. In language we grow into world; 
it introduces us to a particular orientation to the world. The word does not attach onto or 
represent the world but is fused with it, indivisible from the insight from which it proceeds, 
always requiring our interpretation but never clarifying it as much as we want. It is Trinitarian 
theology that awakens us to the interpretive mode of being, reminding us that human 
consciousness is embedded in language and indissoluble from it. All thought is historical, 
because there is no seeing and understanding without saying, and the language that makes 
thought possible has a historical context. Thought needs language in order to exist at all.   
 
The verbum interius and Historically Effected Consciousness 
 
In Gadamer’s thinking, human understanding is a historical understanding: “Historical 
consciousness . . . adopts a reflective posture toward both itself and the tradition in which it is 
situated. It understands itself in terms of its own history. Historical consciousness is a mode of 
self-knowledge.”74 Gadamer repeatedly emphasises that human understanding is an effect of 
history and insists that one must recognise one’s being historically effected in order to recover 
philosophy from the problems of the Enlightenment that removes understanding from the 
world of experience. Gadamer refers to the mode of recognising one’s being historically 
effected as “historically effected consciousness.” 75 According to Gadamer, even before we 
consciously recognise our being historically effected, we have already fused the past and 
                                                          
74 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 228. Italics in the original. 
75 Wirkungsgeshichtliches Bewusstein 
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present by our very our situated being in the world.76 As historical beings, we stand within the 
past: “we are always already affected by history. It determines in advance both what seems to 
us worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation, and we more or 
less forget half of what is really there.”77 We are not disconnected from history, in which 
history is a separate, isolated compartment in which we define ourselves over and against the 
object of knowing; rather, history is the “enactment of understanding”78: “In fact history does 
not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of 
self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state 
in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the 
individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life.”79 
Gadamer understands language as that which embeds human consciousness in 
tradition: “The linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of historically effected 
consciousness.”80 Partly this lingual experience has to do with the fact that conversation is what 
allows us to expand our historical perspectives: “The historical movement of human life 
consists of the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one statement, and hence can never 
have a truly closed horizon.”81 The word horizon is a key term in Gadamer’s thought, because 
the word connotes the idea that historical understanding is a kind of vantage point that 
expands in the exchange of human understanding and dialogue82: 
The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from 
a particular vantage point . . . A person who has no horizon does not see far 
enough and hence over-values what is nearest to him. On the other hand, “to 
have a horizon” means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see 
                                                          
76 Zimmermann, 236.  
77 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 301, cited in Zimmermann, 243. 
78 Zimmermann, 243. 
79 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 278, cited in Zimmermann, 243. 
80 Ibid., 391. Italics in the original. 
81 Ibid., 303. 
82 Zimmermann, 242. 
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beyond it . . . working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right 
horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition.83 
According to Gadamer, the word expands this horizon, because it brings forth the past which 
we have “failed to remember” and allows us to contemplate the future.84 Arthos has a beautiful 
way of phrasing this: “This is the particular pathos of human nature, that it is too frail for any 
real constancy, and yet it is somehow chosen to renew this fitful awareness, to keep its tie.”85 
Our finitude means that we may not understand meaning in full, yet we still seem to 
understand it as a whole.86 Historically effected consciousness is a recognition of this 
juxtaposition, both that we are “too weak to see and capable of seeing.”87 The word draws out 
this juxtaposition, in showing that we understand precisely because we stand within a lingual 
horizon: “The historical life of a tradition depends on being constantly assimilated and 
interpreted. All interpretation that was correct in itself would be a foolish ideal that mistook 
the nature of tradition. Every interpretation has to adapt itself to the hermeneutical situation to 
which it belongs.”88 
 For Gadamer, the word carries the meaning of the world that makes human 
understanding possible. “Prejudices, tradition, and authority” passed through the word are not 
obstacles to the truth that one must mitigate through technological precision or empirical 
investigation89 but are the “very enactment” of human understanding.90 Gadamer’s optimistic 
view of prejudices is the conclusion of his work on the historically effected consciousness, 
because the fact that we are an effect of history means that history and tradition are the 
                                                          
83 Gadamer., 301-302, cited in Zimmermann 242. 
84 I borrow the structure and insight of Arthos, 254. The quote is Arthos. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. The quote is Arthos; the reference to historically effected consciousness is mine, though of course, 
Arthos is essentially making t 
88 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 398. 
89 Zimmermann, 237. 
90 Ibid., 234. 
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foundation of understanding, one which we cannot and need not escape.91 According to 
Gadamer, the positivists saw prejudices as a hindrance to objective knowing and in so doing 
had a “prejudice against prejudice” that sought to detach the “interpreter from the 
interpreted.”92 What we learn from the word that encompasses human consciousness and 
passes through us is that the knower belongs to tradition and carries with this a prejudice. In 
fact, the knower does not have neutral-free zone in which she can escape in order to free 
herself from all pre-judgments, because her historical consciousness is mediated through 
history and language. While Gadamer is not suggesting that one should blindly follow the 
culture norm without questions or critical reflection, Gadamer also emphasises that we should 
acknowledge the role of prejudgments in our understanding, and indeed, a failure to 
acknowledge our prejudices would only blind us from our own ideology.93 This is why Gadamer 
says: “We should learn to understand ourselves better and recognize that in all understanding, 
whether we are expressively aware of it or not, the efficacy of history is at work. When a naïve 
faith in scientific method denies the existence of effective history, there can be an actual 
deformation of knowledge.”94 
 
The Verbum Interius and the Humanities 
 
Gadamer sees the verbum interius as a development that upends the positivist paradigms that 
                                                          
91 Ibid, 237. 
92 Gadamer, 272. 
93 On this point, Habermas criticised Gadamer’s hermeneutics as failing to allow for an objective perspective. 
In response, Gadamer defended hermeneutics as an objective phenomenon, a point that the verbum interius 
strengthens, because the notion of the Incarnation fuses together truth and Word, thereby establishing truth 
within language and history, rather than within “subjective thought.” Though not in reference to Habermas, 
the second-half of this sentence is from Arthos, 71-72. 
94 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 300. 
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have devalued the human sciences. Gadamer fights against the the technological precision and 
scientific methods that want to define the truth only in scientific terms, thereby concealing the 
real importance of the humanities as more than appreciation but rather an encounter with 
truth. In assuming that one can form a concept in a pure act of the intellect, the positivists and 
rationalists ignored the truths of the humanities that exemplify our interdependence with 
history. As a response, Gadamer points out that it is history that makes knowledge possible. 
Gadamer appeals to the Trinitarian analogy of the verbum interius in order to illustrate that all 
understanding is embedded in the world. As illustrated by the Trinitarian identity of thought 
and word, Gadamer is able to show that the word is the medium of insight, dispersed through 
communities and cultures and that meaning resides within the word. Gadamer is then able to 
show that the historical dispersion of what is meaningful and true through artwork and the 
humanities is a model that challenges the rationalist and positivist paradigms that want to 
reduce knowledge to what is ready-at-hand. This dispersion is seen because the Trinitarian 
relation of insight and word reminds us that meaning resides within the texts that speak to us, 
because the word is a movement that brings forth meaning and thought, in a similar way that 
the Son is the fullness of the Father’s mind. All of this, Gadamer argues, legitimises the truths of 
the human sciences, in that the word and text are not a distortion of meaning but the fullness of 
meaning.  
The verbum interius also brings us to the truths embodied in the human sciences, in 
reminding us that there is a kind of knowledge that does not have to do with mastery of an idea 
but a familiar immersion or indeed a participation in that idea. What we learn from Augustine’s 
Trinitarian speculations is that knowledge is not always a matter of empirical investigation but 
rather of standing within truths that we do not understand but are yet familiar. In 1997, Jean 
Grondin asked Gadamer, who was in his late 90s at the time and thus was reflecting back upon 
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his lifelong work and greatest influences, why he had connected the hermeneutical task of 
finding the “right word” to Augustine’s verbum interius. One might expect that Gadamer would 
reminisce upon the details of the verbum analogy to help us understand intellection or thought 
and yet as Arthos is apt to point out, Gadamer’s answer was curiously more focused on what 
Augustine upended, namely the gnostics, who had severed flesh and spirit, in much the same 
way as Plato had severed the material or tangible word from the truth of things.95 Commenting 
upon De Trinitate, Gadamer says: “it took Augustine no less than 15 books to get closer to the 
secret of the Trinity without falling into the false way of the gnostic presumption . . .  
Augustine’s attempt in his books is to say that the greatest mystery of the Christian 
proclamation and revelation can nevertheless be made somewhat understandable through 
analogies. To this extent he believed that by using this approach he went beyond the gnostic 
attacks.”96 One of Augustine’s great contributions to hermeneutics is reminding us that there 
are mysteries that we do not understand in full but are yet somehow familiar. Augustine 
countered Gnosticism in showing that belief in the divinity of Incarnate Son is not incoherent 
because we have analogies that are afforded to us from language: “Augustine presented fifteen 
analogies to the mystery of the Trinity – precisely to show that not everything is governable by 
humans.  There are things that are close and intimate, like the things that are familiar to us and 
for which we have language.”97 In order to understand how the Son proceeds from the Father 
while remaining within his being, not separate but within, one only need to consider the way in 
which the word proceeds from thought. The verbum helps hermeneutists to conceive human 
language as a procession from act to act, and human language provides theologians a passage 
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into the deepest mysteries of the divine. Gadamer’s re-appropriation of the verbum interius is 
not to be mistaken as a statement of faith, and indeed even for Augustine it not a logical proof 
of God. Rather, it is to say that the same speculation that defeated Gnosticism, namely 
Augustine’s demonstration of the presence of truths that cannot be mastered, also defeats 
instrumentalism and positivism, because it opens us toward the way of hermeneutics, in which 
the word is always an expression of what exceeds our understanding, while we remain 
“capable of seeing”98 because we can speak the word.99  
A hermeneutical perspective of human finitude establishes the validity of the human 
sciences, precisely because it shows us that human knowledge is not reducible to empirical 
methodology but only arises from our being creatures of the world. In light of our finitude, we 
see that it is not dissecting an object into entities that can be represented in language that 
constitutes knowledge but our situation in history.100 The nature of the human sciences is one 
of constant interpretation. In reading a book, we only partially grasp the meaning, for when we 
read it a second time, new insights are revealed. A book can pass from one generation to 
another in history, and it carries along with it the conversations and interpretations that have 
enclosed it, while always being open to new interpretations. In fact, history is not an obstacle to 
our knowledge of the text, but that which allows us access it in the first place.101 The 
rationalists who devalue the human sciences and claim that we can evoke knowledge to full 
presence or can a trace a historical text back to its “original” authorial intention conceal that 
there is always something that escapes our attention. There is much that remains unsaid when 
we say something but nevertheless lurks underneath human consciousness. This is why 
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Gadamer connects the unending task of hermeneutics to always trying to find the right word 
but never having the last word. Hermeneutics confronts our limitations. Our understanding is 
always incomplete, exceeding the grasp of intention, yet involved in the process of finding a 
word that expresses the subject matter in order to understand. “What cannot be understood,” 
Gadamer writes, “can pose an endless task of at least finding a word that comes a little closer to 
the matter at issue.”102 Augustine’s analogy is emblematic of this finitude, because it shows that 
we can approach the subject at hand, while also recognising that our understanding of the 
matter is incomplete. Human understanding is the embodiment of the world passed through 
the word: “Understanding is . . . the original form of the realization of Dasein, which is being-in-
the-world.”103 
The conditioning of the natural sciences and rationalist epistemologies nearly 
blindsided the best of the intellectual thinkers in the humanities to this historical being-in-the-
world so central to the task of the human sciences. Jens Zimmermann’s summary of the history 
of hermeneutics is helpful.104 As Zimmermann notes, Gadamer argues that many thinkers failed 
to understand the extent to which we are temporal creatures immersed and embedded within 
tradition and history and thus could not provide an adequate response to the rise of logical 
positivism.105 In its forgetfulness of language, philosophy failed to understand the identity of 
thought and word. Schleiermacher noted that we should retrace the historical past in order to 
understand an author, but he also forgot that the word says or shows us the thing, even in 
historical distance.106 Ranke similarly understood that tradition influences the present; the 
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issue, for Gadamer, is that he continued to follow the Enlightenment notion of “the full self-
transparency of being,”107 concealing that we also bring to our historical discussions our own 
historical consciousness, which means that history also conforms to our understanding.108 Kant 
correctly understood that objects conform to our understanding and thus that we do not have a 
simple presence with the empirical world; yet according to Gadamer, he failed to overcome the 
privilege given to the natural sciences, because he did not recognise the extent to which human 
understanding arises from our being-in-the-world (what Heidegger calls Dasein).109 Dilthey 
correctly understood that human “life and knowing” are indivisible.110 Zimmermann writes, 
“Dilthey, in effect, tried to recapture, without its Christian underpinnings . . . Vico’s notion that 
humans can understand what they make.”111 The issue from Gadamer’s perspective is that 
while Dilthey understood that the human sciences disclose the historical understanding of the 
human being, he continued to assume that the natural sciences speak to the empirically given. 
While not his intent, his assumption continued to leave truth to the realm of the natural science 
and methodological investigation and the human sciences to the realm of non-truth. Husserl 
also tried to dismantle the dualism of the natural sciences and human sciences in showing that 
both are derived from the “achievements of the intentionality”112 that underline human 
understanding.113 Despite these efforts, Zimmermann notes, these thinkers in Gadamer’s 
interpretation failed to fully understand the extent to which we are embedded within tradition, 
as the whole underpinning of knowledge. According to Gadamer, Zimmermann argues, it is 
                                                          
107 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 208. 
108 Zimmermann., 234. 
109 Ibid., 234. The reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is mine, though the reference to Kant in general 
is Zimmermann’s. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 249-250, cited in the footnote of Zimmermann, 234. 
113 Zimmermann, 234.  
 
39 
 
only in recognising that our location in history is the foundation of understanding that we bring 
the natural and human sciences together and restore the human sciences to truth.114 Despite 
what the methodology of the empirical sciences have led us to assume, there is no act of 
understanding apart from our situation in history: “Understanding is not a resigned ideal of 
human experience adopted in the old age of spirit, as with Dilthey; nor is it, as with Husserl, a 
last methodological ideal of philosophy in contrast to the naivete of unreflecting life; it is, on 
the contrary . . . Dasein’s mode of being.”115 
The verbum interius represents a high point of Gadamer’s aim to legitimise the human 
sciences as a vital source of knowledge, because it shows that the word is a growth of truth that 
is never divorced from the mediation of the world. It is in belonging to tradition that the truth 
of things is disclosed, and it is the word that carries this tradition, encompassing our entire 
being. The identity of word with thought reminds hermeneutics that all thought is historical, 
and so tradition and history are not barriers to overcome but the “very enactment” of 
understanding.116 There is no disjoint between word and truth, and thus the word says truth, as 
it resides in the human sciences, as a living conversation that passes through us. This identity 
means that, contrary to what the method of empirical and rationalist epistemologies may have 
conditioned us to believe, we do not hover above truth in an objective, “bird’s eye” view of the 
world but are immersed in it: “What has come down to us by way of verbal tradition is not left 
over but given to us, told us – whether through direct retelling, in which myth, legend, and 
custom have their life, or through written tradition, whose signs are, as it were, immediately 
clear to every reader who can read them.”117 
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Conclusion 
 
The Trinitarian relations brought to hermeneutics attention the identity of thought and word 
that grounds human understanding in interpretation and historical consciousness. The model 
of Trinitarian relations as an identity of thought with word shows us that thought is made 
possible in language and is truly fused with it, such that there is no understanding without the 
word that has carried us. The word enlivens the thoughts and insights from which it proceeds, 
carrying it across generations, communicating truth in one’s belonging to tradition. Thought 
itself is possible because it conceives this word, which means that human consciousness is 
historical through and through, in so far as the word that makes thought possible has a 
historical context. It is a hermeneutical perspective of the verbum interius that establishes the 
validity of the human sciences, precisely because it shows that human knowledge is not 
reducible to empirical methodology but only arises from our being creatures embedded within 
the world. 
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2 
“It Has Its Being in Its Revealing” 
Augustine, Gadamer, and the Word that Says 
 
Augustine of Hippo and Hans-Georg Gadamer are substantially different thinkers, with a 
common interest in Trinitarian theology. Augustine was for Gadamer a pivotal thinker in 
western thought, contributing to the forgetfulness of the word and bringing language back to 
hermeneutics. Augustine forgot that thought is historical and that we always already 
understand. In Augustine’s thinking, human understanding is not predetermined by history 
and culture. According to Augustine, we have a direct insight and then speak a word that 
expresses the insight, and thus transition from not understanding (potency) to understanding 
(act). Gadamer challenges this. For Gadamer, we always already understand, because we 
belong to tradition. For Gadamer, human understanding is a movement from an understanding 
mediated by history (act) to a word that speaks its meaning (act). Gadamer’s turn to Augustine 
is thus an equivocation, an irony compounded by the fact that Augustine’s realism – 
Augustine’s belief that we see the real meaning of the thing in an immediate sense and then 
express it in terms of a word– is derived from Plato’s theory of forms that Gadamer argues was 
the “epoch-making decision” that “banished” knowledge to the “intellectual sphere,” until we 
forgot that the meaningfulness of things resides within the word.118 In arguing this, Gadamer 
says, “Plato’s discovery of the ideas conceals the true nature of language even more than the 
theories of the Sophists.”119  
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 My work here is to show that Gadamer underplays the difference between his 
hermeneutics and Augustine’s Platonism in order to make a complete non-Augustinian point, 
namely that all thought is historical and that we always already understand because we speak 
the word. Gadamer can do this because Augustine’s Trinitarian theology deconstructs his own 
Platonism. In reflecting upon the mystery of the Triune God, Augustine forms an analogy 
between the divine word and the human word and in this light, he unwittingly restores 
hermeneutics to the word as that which speaks the mind. I will discuss Augustine’s Trinitarian 
breakthrough in two sections. In the first section, I will show that Augustine led us to a 
hermeneutical understanding of the word when he substituted the word for the Platonic form, 
which was a recognition that seeing is not a mere cleaving to an abstract truth but an utterance 
of a truth. In the second section, I will show that the analogy between the human word and the 
divine word allows Augustine to show that the word is brought to full expression in the act of 
speaking and thus the word is not a simple reflection on truth.  
 
The Appearance of the Word  
 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer summarises the Augustinian contribution of the inner word as one that 
says or speaks the thing: “[Language] has its being in its revealing,” Gadamer writes in direct reference to 
Augustine, “Exactly the same is true in the mystery of the Trinity.”120 Gadamer believes that Augustine’s 
Trinitarian analogy between the divine word and the human word begins to awaken us to the fact that the 
word is not a lens in which we see the thing in an immediate sense, but the word is that which says and 
speaks the thing to us. Gadamer’s reading of the verbum interius as a saying that reveals the thing is an 
extension of a project already begun in Heidegger. Arthos explains that Heidegger reflects upon the inner 
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word of Augustine’s Confessions as a movement between “worldly experience” and “insight.”121 The 
questions, guilt, and desire that ignites Augustine’s passion for God is a kind of a “longing for fulfillment” 
that “makes possible further growth and becoming-felt.”122 As Arthos shows in quoting Augustine, 
Augustine’s verbal confession is a movement between his thoughts and his experiences, which serves as a 
hermeneutical reminder that “our living consciousness is a constant following and interweaving of 
situations.”123 I would add that this enigma of understanding is more than interpretation. Augustine’s 
confessions are an encounter with insight, which takes the form of an event or address that changes us in 
the process of understanding. The late-Heidegger understood this truth-event well: “hermeneutics means 
not just interpretation but, even before it, the bearing of message and tiding.”124 The word is an event, and 
language itself speaks and shows the thing: “But then does language itself speak? How should it manage to 
do so, when it is not even equipped with the instruments of voice? Nevertheless, it is language that speaks. 
What language properly pursues, right from the start, is the essential unfolding of speech, of saying. 
Language speaks by saying; that is, by showing.”125 Gadamer’s reading of the verbum interius is in debt to 
the late-Heidegger’s point that the word does not just see the thing but bears its truth and changes us 
through its revelation. 
It is because of his incarnational theology that Augustine leads hermeneutics to the realisation 
that language itself speaks. In the climatic verbum passage in book 15 of De Trinitite that Gadamer cites in 
Truth and Method, Augustine explains that the inner word is “sprung” from the sight of knowledge, 
emerging from one’s understanding of the subject matter being revealed, unable to be severed from it: 
                                                          
121 In this sentence and the following two, I use the argument and structure of Arthos, 5. 
122 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of the Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-
Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 250, as cited in Arthos, 5. The quotes are Heidegger; 
the interpretation and reading is Arthos.  
123 Ibid. The quote is Heidegger; the interpretation and reading is Arthos.  
124 Heidegger, “On the Way to Language,” trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1971), 29. 
125 Ibid., “On the Way to Language,” in Basic Writings: From being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking 
(1964), ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Harper Perennial, 2008), 411. 
 
44 
 
“for the word is then most like the thing known, from which also its image is begotten, since the sight of 
thinking arises from the sight of knowledge . . . [it is] a true word concerning a true thing, having nothing of 
its own, but wholly derived from the knowledge from which it is born. The word is true, i.e. sprung from 
things that are known.”126 When one understands a subject matter in a moment of conclusion, the act of 
understanding gives birth to an inner word that remains indivisible from the subject matter. This 
identification of insight and word resembles the Son’s procession from the Father, because the human 
word, like the divine word, is nothing by itself but rather remains within understanding. Commenting 
upon this Augustinian passage, Gadamer explains, “The mystery of the Trinity is mirrored in the miracle of 
language insofar as the word is true, because it says what the thing is, is nothing by itself and does not seek 
to be anything: nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa Scientia de qua nascitur.”127 Gadamer argues that it is 
this human resemblance to the Trinity that served as the foreshadow of the breakthrough in 
hermeneutics to the “saying” of word, as it is immediately after this Augustinian citation that Gadamer 
writes, “[The Word] has its being in its revealing.”128 For Gadamer, the word is not an understanding 
without saying but an understanding in saying.  
It is because of Augustine’s Trinitarian speculation that Gadamer can distance himself from 
Augustine by agreeing with him. In distinction to Gadamer’s non-instrumental hermeneutics, which 
recognises the word as a gift of meaning, Augustine had initially inherited from strands of Platonist 
thought an instrumentalist philosophy that had reduced the word to a mere sign along a mathematical 
model. We see the remnants of this inheritance when Augustine says “the word that sounds outwardly is 
the sign of the word that gives light inwardly.”129 In this sentence, Augustine is closer to Plato’s Cratylus 
which had suggested that words should be evaluated upon their natural agreement with their object, than 
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to the hermeneutics of early Greek which, similar to Christian thought, believed that a word and thing 
were so interdependent that a name “belongs to its bearer.”130 It is doubtful that Augustine would say, as 
Gadamer says, that the emergence of the word is a procession from act to act, from a thought always 
already full of meaning in the mind to a word that speaks its meaning. Augustine would hold this to be 
exclusive of divine thought, while the human word is to be only understood as potency to act, from not 
understanding (potency) to understanding (act). Augustine’s instrumentalist inheritance from Plato is 
why Gadamer argues that Trinitarian speculation would become so crucial to the history of philosophy. 
When Augustine speaks of God’s Word as the manifestation of divine insight, he unwittingly turns 
towards hermeneutics in exemplifying the word as a manifestation of meaning, rather than an 
instrumental sign. Regardless of Augustine’s own background and belief, Gadamer’s argument is that 
instrumentalism is defeated in his attention to the divine procession because the human word, made in 
the image of the divine procession, is not a mere cipher of prior meaning but the birth and expression of 
an insight already there and that is being unfolded dynamically through language and conversation.131 
Gadamer refuses to soften the theological significance of Augustine: Heidegger’s notion 
of the word as saying is rooted in Augustine’s theological professions. Thirty-six years after the 
publication of Truth and Method, Gadamer told Grondin that he connected the hermeneutical 
nature of human understanding to the verbum interius, “Precisely because it took Augustine no 
less than 15 books to get closer to the secret of the Trinity without falling into the false way of 
the gnostic presumption.”132 It was Augustine’s formulation of the verbum interius as a model 
for approaching the unknowability of the Trinity that would challenge the division between 
flesh and spirit under the direction of the Gnostics, and in this similar way would challenge the 
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western tendency to severe word from truth.133 Gadamer’s conversation with Grondin echoes 
his earlier statement in Truth and Method that the verbum interius is “not a mere metaphor” for 
the Trinitarian structure.134 Augustine never intended us to conceive of the word as a mere 
proposition about the mechanics of the Trinity, but it was all along a recognition that our 
attempt to understand the world which exceeds our grasp is matter of language, which is why 
Augustine keeps reflecting back towards the inner word as his fundamental way of knowing 
and being.135 The human word is not simply a representation of knowledge but more 
importantly our ontological mode of being. 
 Augustine’s inner word inches towards the word as a seeing in saying, when he suggests 
that the verbum is a movement between self and God that allows for a moment of 
understanding. Augustine’s inner word is more than a sign that represents concepts along a 
mathematical grid; for Augustine, the word is hermeneutical because it is a transformative 
event in which the person is able “to see better and better” what appears through a spiritual, 
transformative experience.136 This circular structure of the word is rooted in Augustine’s 
search for the imago Dei in the human person and his belief that the verbum interius is an 
exemplification of this image. Augustine finds a trace of God in his own inner words.137 
Augustine writes, echoing Paul’s confession in 1 Corinthians that we see God dimly as an 
enigma, that the “word of the mind” is a “glass and an enigma” in which “we see the word of 
God.”138 As Arthos points out, the inner word is both the sight of knowledge and the medium 
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that transforms his understanding.139 Augustine learns about the identity of the Father and the 
divine word, for example, when he reflects upon the identity of human thought and word. 
“When we call thoughts speeches of the heart, it does not follow that they are not also acts of 
sight, arising from the sight of knowledge, when they are true. For when these things are done 
outwardly by means of the body, then speech and sight are different things: but when we think 
inwardly, the two are one.”140 This kinship to the godhead serves as more than a theological 
conclusion about the triune God. As a model for understanding God, it is the very medium that 
lifts Augustine’s being towards knowledge. In this way, Arthos argues that Augustine’s inner 
word is both substance and act.141 The saying which appears is both an encounter with truth 
and the meaning that transforms the person (spiritually for Augustine), allowing for a moment 
of understanding.142  
Augustine paves the way for Gadamer’s breakthrough to the remembrance of language, 
because it is the word that says or shows something, addressing us as a whole. Hermeneutics 
begins from the position that we have an awareness of the meaning which presents itself to 
us.143 In listening, we possess an uncanny ability to imagine or discern the meaning of the 
truths we seek to understand, before we fully understand its meaning or even consciously 
consider that we understand. This “absent presence” is the essence of the hermeneutical circle 
that Heidegger developed, although its insight stems from ancient philosophy.144 The 
hermeneutical circle attempts to answer the question of how we can discern meaning as a 
whole, even though the nature of human finitude means that we only experience a part. 
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Augustine asks this question in book ten of De Trinitate.145 How can one desire to know God if 
one is ignorant of his presence?146 How does one understand human attributes in its perfection 
if we only experience those attributes within ourselves and others as inadequate and broken? 
As if anticipating Heidegger, Augustine speaks of this human ability to formulate meaning in 
terms of part and whole; the mind somehow projects or imagines the meaning of the subject 
matter at hand through its parts. Augustine writes, “I do not say, [the mind] knows wholly; but 
what it knows, it knows as a whole.”147 This ability to imagine a subject matter as a whole is 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle: “interpretation,” Heidegger says, “will be founded essentially 
upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.”148 Gadamer’s example of reading of a book 
provides an illustration of this capacity to project meaning, to have a fore-sight. 149 The reader 
understands each sentence and paragraph of a book through anticipation of the whole, an 
understanding which she will then revise and expand as she reads along. But here is the puzzle. 
If we are able to approach and understand a subject matter, something must present itself in 
such a way that understanding is possible, otherwise we would remain unaware of its meaning 
and unable to imagine its whole. Heidegger explains this understanding this way: “From the 
very beginning, there occurs a holding together: man’s holding himself together with 
something in such a way that he can come into agreement with whatever he is holding himself 
together with . . . Only something which is referred to as such in the utterance can be held 
together, something with which, in uniting it, this holding together agrees.”150As Arthos points 
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out, Heidegger and Gadamer will argue that the word is what presents itself, holding together 
mind and world.151 It is the word that lets us imagine the whole, allowing us to understand in 
and through the way in which we are at home in language and the world. Gadamer says, 
“Language is the medium in which substantive understanding and agreement take place.”152 It 
is the word that “says” or “shows” something to us, addressing us as a whole and us 
anticipating its address in return.  
Both Augustine and Heidegger locate the phenomenon of understanding within the 
word. Heidegger says that it is the word that allows us to self-understand our understanding, 
so that we can enter the hermeneutical circle “the right way.” 153 He writes: 
The circle of understanding is . . . not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, 
or even of a circle which is merely to be tolerated. In the circle is hidden a 
positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we 
genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have 
understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-
having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us. 154  
 
All understanding begins with one’s presuppositions. We can recognise our finitude and our 
being historically effected because we have language. Somehow, despite our historical situation 
and limited perspective of the subject matter, we can arrive at an understanding and imagine 
the whole of its meaning. This is where we see that there is a sense in which human 
understanding is a movement from being in potency to really understanding, because unlike 
God’s word, we proceed in a series of incomplete acts of understanding that are always being 
revised along the way. Augustine would note that this miracle of understanding is a matter of 
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the grace of God, but he also unwittingly shows that understanding resides within the word 
that speaks the thing.   
 Part of the reason Augustine arrives at the word as the pivotal point in the circle of 
understanding is that he substitutes the inner word for the Platonic form of things, thereby 
upending any notion that the word is a mere sign of truth. Augustine disrupts his own 
background in Platonism and the course of western thought more broadly, when he turns to 
the verbum interius as that which utters and says the thing, against the Platonic notion that the 
mind sees the truth in an immediate sense. The western epistemic means of approaching 
knowledge through a mind to which all else is an object is subverted, when Augustine’s inner 
word functions as the mediation between the self and truth. In his platonic moments, Augustine 
retreats into his mind, because he believes the mind is distorted by the mundane, which 
hinders one’s ability to see truth immediately.155 In his Trinitarian contemplation, however, the 
human mind is no longer the primary bridge to the divine; rather, it is the inner word that 
functions as that hinge and thus utters the truth. Augustine had no intention to upend the 
western emphasis on the mind; he sought knowledge of the divine word and in this effort 
reconceived the verbum interius in light of the Trinitarian relations. Yet language theory took a 
momentous step when Augustine said that it is the inner word that mediates self and truth. 
Augustine makes this point when he writes that the word mediates the mind and its 
knowledge. “A word . . . is knowledge together with love. Whenever, then, the mind knows and 
loves itself, its word is joined to it by love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, both 
the word is in love and love is in the word, and both are in him who loves and speaks.”156 
Arthos points out that what Augustine is saying is that the word is circular: one’s love and 
                                                          
155 Arthos, 111. 
156 Augustine, De Trinitate, 9.15, cited in Arthos, 118. In terms of the Trinitarian analogy, love is the work of 
the Holy Spirit. 
 
51 
 
desire for knowledge moves one from “love to word, word to love, and both to and from the 
mind.” 157 The word mediates self and knowledge and speaks its object.  
Here is where Augustine interests Gadamer in his step away from Platonism: Augustine 
does not say that the word is formed through reason or mathematical notation but that the 
word is part of a spiritual or transformative experience that happens to us because we love 
truth and are involved in it. In the act of understanding, born from one’s involvement in truth, 
the word says or shows the form of the thing. “We behold,” Augustine says, “the form according 
to which we are, and according to which we do anything” and by this form “we have the true 
knowledge of things, thence conceived, as it were as a word within us, and by speaking we 
beget it from within; nor by being born does it depart from us.”158 Augustine’s idea that the 
mind contains the form of things is platonic, and Gadamer will certainly not follow this 
Augustinian metaphysical conviction. However, Augustine also departs from Platonism in one 
notable way, which I would argue deconstructs Platonism from within Augustine’s own 
Platonism. In the above passage, Augustine does not see the form of things in an immediate 
sense and then utter the word but rather sees the thing through the utterance of the word. The 
human soul loves truth, and the word conceived from this desire transforms the person in 
understanding. Augustine writes, “by cleaving to that very same form itself which they behold, 
so that from thence, [the word] may be formed.”159 Augustine’s inner word breaks through his 
own Platonism, because it introduces the word as that which says or speaks the form of the 
thing. 
Augustine substitutes the verbum interius for the Platonic form in his discussion of 
justice. Augustine questions how we can recognise and understand the concept of justice, if this 
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concept is unknowable via the senses. Augustine is intrigued that it is not sense perception 
itself that mediates person and truth.160 Knowledge of immaterial forms, such as justice, 
provides a clear example of a truth which we gather without the direct aid of the senses. “We 
know within ourselves what it is to be [just]. For I find this nowhere else when I seek to utter it, 
except within myself; and if I ask another what it is to [just], he seeks within himself what to 
answer, and whosoever hence can answer truly, he has found within himself what to 
answer.”161 When we seek to understand something, we are able to utter an image within 
ourselves of it, even if we have not yet experienced it within ourselves or ever observed this 
inner mental state with the human eye. We have an immaterial impression of this being that 
connects mind and truth in a way that enables understanding. Arthos notes that we might 
expect that Augustine will call this impression a form, but again Augustine instead calls it the 
verbum.162 “The word is the image.”163Augustine’s choice to substitute the Christian verbum for 
the platonic form may seem insignificant, but it was ultimately that step which Gadamer argues 
recovered us from the forgetfulness of language, because it reminded us that the word 
proceeds from the act of understanding (act to act). What interests Gadamer is that we do not 
see in an immediate sense, but that we produce concepts that express what we have come to 
understand.   
 
The Two Similarities to God’s Word 
 
Gadamer was aware that these hermeneutical insights stem from Augustine’s reflection upon a 
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causal link between the inner word and the divine word. “This inner word is the mirror and the 
image of the divine word. When Augustine and the Scholastics consider the problem of the 
verbum in order to attain the conceptual means to elucidate the mystery of the Trinity, they are 
concerned exclusively with this inner word, the word of the heart.”164 Augustine’s word speaks 
truth, because the inner word is not a mere metaphor for God’s word but one of participation in 
his being165: “so when we know God, although we are made better than we were before we 
knew Him, and above all when the same knowledge being also liked and worthily loved 
becomes a word, and so that knowledge becomes a kind of likeness of God.”166 
My argument in this section is that Augustine’s hermeneutics remembers language at 
the time that the human word most approaches the divine word, as it is in that moment that it 
is most clear that the subject matter is brought to full expression in the word, as a saying of the 
meaningfulness of the thing. The ability of the human word to approach the divine word raises 
questions, however, because Augustine also argues that the inner word resembles the divine 
word when it is purified from the sensible realm, a complete non-Gadamerian teaching, since 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics works on the assumption that we understand through our 
involvement in the sensible world. Augustine’s devaluation of the sensible world would 
arguably lead to the attempt to distill the inner life from external influences and would reduce 
the external word to a sign of the truth conceived inwardly, as we see, for instance, in the 
common modern belief that language functions as an instrument of the reasoning faculty.167 
Gadamer resists this modern dualism and instrumentalisation for its inability to recognise that 
the word is the all-encompassing horizon of understanding and its failure to acknowledge that 
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word is not merely that by which one sees but a seeing in saying. Yet Gadamer refuses to 
entirely fault this instrumentalism on Augustine and in fact, goes as far as telling Grondin that 
Augustine’s verbum interius rescues us from this instrumentalism and returns us to the 
remembrance of language. 168 This equivocation is a puzzle, and one that has garnered negative 
attention from Gadamarian scholars. “Gadamer’s reliance upon Augustine is overstated,” David 
Vessey writes, “Either Grondin—and perhaps Gadamer too—is misreading Augustine.”169 
Vessey is prudent to point out the contention between the two thinkers, but I would argue that 
Gadamer was aware of Augustine’s intent. Gadamer cannot be more clear: “the external word, 
and with it the whole problem of the variety of languages, was explicitly devalued by 
Augustine.”170 Despite Augustine’s devaluation of the word, Gadamer urges us to look deeper, 
beyond Augustine’s Platonism, and into the deeper structure of the word that underlines 
Trinitarian thought: “it is a quite specific side of the nature of language that comes to light 
here.”171 There is a significant hermeneutical point underneath the contention between 
Augustine and Gadamer. Gadamer underplays the difference between Augustine’s theological 
hermeneutics and Heidegger’s philosophical hermeneutics, in order to make an un-Augustinian 
point about the historical and lingual nature of thought. In what follows, I will introduce two 
ways that the human word approaches the divine word as articulated by Arthos but derived 
from Augustine, and then show that hermeneutics can learn from these two ways that the 
subject matter is brought to expression in the utterance of the word. We can learn about the 
nature of the word from these hermeneutical points, despite the contention between Augustine 
and Gadamer. 
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Augustine first draws upon the inner word’s likeness to the divine word in its pre-
formed state. There is a kind of word within us, which Arthos calls the word of “indirect 
reflection,” that is not yet formed into a concept but is the “a priori condition” of the concept.172 
Phenomenologically, we know the presence of this deeper, dormant word, because whenever 
we seek to acquire a new concept, we find ourselves reflecting upon an “inkling” of a word that  
“makes that reflection possible” in the first place173: “But this is a still more hidden depth of our 
memory, wherein we found this also first when we thought of it, and wherein an inner word is 
begotten such as belongs to no tongue, -- as it were, knowledge of knowledge, vision of vision, 
and understanding which appears in [reflective] thought; of understanding which had indeed 
existed before in the memory, but was latent there.”174 The indirect word of reflection is that 
which has yet to develop and form into a concept of reflection.175 The indirect word is the 
structure of the concept, a word “formable, but not yet formed.”176 Augustine illustrates this 
word of indirect reflection through his ability to formulate an image of Alexandria. He notices 
that, although he has never seen Alexandria, he was able formulate an image or concept of 
Alexandria from an inner word already present, that is, from a vague notion of a city that was 
waiting to be formed into a precise image or concept. In this sense that the word awakes itself 
into a concept, Arthos argues that Augustine’s word of indirect reflection is its own knowledge, 
or perhaps more accurately, that the two are the same177: “When [the word] seeks to know 
itself, it knows itself now as seeking . . . In the very fact that it seeks itself, it is clearly convicted 
that of being more known to itself than unknown. For it knows itself as seeking and as not 
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knowing itself, in that it seeks to know itself.”178 The word and knowledge are near 
synonymous: “Knowledge bears a likeness to that which it knows, that is, of which it is the 
knowledge.”179 
Gadamer turns to the word of indirect reflection in order to make a hermeneutical point 
about the way in which the word is revealed, all the while knowing that this word of indirect 
reflection was a part of the forgetfulness of language in western thought, because it denied the 
lingual and historical nature of consciousness. Augustine describes the word of indirect 
reflection as that which is “before all sound, before all thought of a sound,”180 and “belongs to 
no tongue.” 181 This is problematic phrase for Gadamer, who recognises that the knower is 
embedded in the word. “We are always already biased in our thinking and knowing by our 
linguistic interpretation of the world,” Gadamer writes, “To grow into this linguistic 
interpretation means to grow up in the world.”182 Augustine denies the lingual nature of 
thought because he is so focused upon the word as the imago Dei, as the mirror of God’s perfect 
knowing, that he overlooks that we always already understand, precisely because we live 
within language. For Augustine, as Augustinian scholar Philip Cary reminds us, God’s 
knowledge is immediate and a perfect expression of his being, and in a similar manner, as the 
imago Dei, the human word can express our mind immediately, without the mediation of 
history and culture.183 This analogy is why Arthos argues that Augustine’s word of indirect 
reflection is its own knowledge, because the word perfectly reflects the mind.184 Yet, it was also 
this emphasis on inwardness that arguably led to Augustine’s forgetfulness of language, in 
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which we forgot that the word operates through the world of history, of language, of culture, 
and of sense.185 Hence, Gadamer says: “The external world, and with it the whole problem of 
the variety of languages, was explicitly devalued by Augustine.”186    
Gadamer underplays the inward retreat of the word of indirect reflection, because he 
wants to make a complete non-Augustinian point, namely that the meaningfulness of the world 
is shown forth in language: “[the word] has its being in its revealing.”187 Gadamer can make this 
point, because the human word is “more than a mere metaphor” for the divine word.188 It is at 
the time that the human word most approaches the divine word that theology remembers the 
word, and it is at this same point that Augustine conceals the word as transposable with the 
culture, unaware of what is at his fingers: “[the word of indirect reflection] is neither 
prolativum (brought forth) nor cogitativum in similtitudine soni (thought in the likeness of 
sound). Hence, this inner word is the mirror and image of the divine.”189 Part of what Gadamer 
sees in this word of indirect reflection that is in need of revelation is that word is always 
appearing out of concealment; this, of course, is also Heidegger’s point and has been brought up 
by Arthos in relation to Gadamer’s inner word. 190 We have seen that for Heidegger the word is 
an appearance that speaks the thing and brings it forth. But Heidegger reminds us that it is 
because the word appears that it was concealed and will keep reappearing and disappearing.191 
Part of the world always escapes us because are finite. As we have seen repeatedly, it is this 
very finitude and situation within history and language that allows us to have a matter of 
understanding in the first place. Along these lines, Gadamer’s fellow hermeneutian Jean-Louis 
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Chrétien noted: “It is always towards what I myself do not understand and cannot master, 
towards what escapes me, that I must lend an ear.”192 Augustine’s inner word of indirect 
reflection that later brings itself forth is an exemplification of this word that escapes us, this 
word in which we lend our ear in order to move the circle of understanding forward. As Arthos 
notes, Augustine’s observation that the mind does not know “wholly; but what it knows, it as a 
whole knows”193 reminds us that something appears to us as a whole, while something is 
always amiss.194 Gadamer disagrees with the notion of a soundless word untainted by tongues, 
but he affirms the sentiment that the pre-formed is always developing and emerging from the 
unsaid, while the word also withdrawals, unable to completely utter all that remains to be said, 
which is why Augustine invokes analogies to approach a God that he cannot fully conceptualise. 
Commenting upon this, Gadamer says, “I personally believe that this [Trinitarian] doctrine has 
constantly stimulated the course of thought in the West as a challenge and invitation to try and 
think that which continually transcends the limits of human understanding.” 195   
Augustine also unwittingly makes a hermeneutical turn towards the remembrance of 
the word in his articulation of the second likeness between the human word and the divine 
word. This second likeness, also articulated by Arthos, is the formed word; it is the word or 
concept that has been formed from the indirect word.196 Arthos points out that Augustine turns 
to the concept in part because the word of indirect reflection is an incomplete image of God, 
because it is potential, in contrast to God’s understanding, which is a complete act.197 In human 
thought, the word of indirect reflection must evolve into a concept, so that we have an act of 
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understanding. This flux and change within human thought is where the analogy between the 
divine word and the human word falls apart – where we see an unlikeness between us and God. 
The divine word is without potency, but the human word has potency.198 Augustine writes, “We 
toss it to and fro by revolving it this way or that, while we think  first one thing and then 
another.”199 Gadamer is well aware of this potency to act: “The human word is potential before 
it is actualized. It is capable of being formed, though it is not yet formed.”200 In this sense, the 
intellect is not analogous to the divine word, since God’s understanding does not evolve.201 
However, once the formation process has been complete, the result is a concept that resembles 
God’s Word because the concept is complete, and thus mirrors God’s Word that endures.202 At 
the end of this process is an act of understanding: “A true word comes into being, when, as I 
said, that which we toss to and fro by revolving it arrives at what which we know, and is 
formed by that, in taking its entire likeness.”203 Augustine repeats the word “true word” several 
times, because it is important to him that the word of indirect reflection can enact itself as 
knowledge, and without the medium of history, that the new concept can accord with true 
knowledge204: “For we are usually said to understand what, by thinking of it, we have found to 
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be true.”205 This is not to suggest that the word invents its own knowledge, but rather that it is 
in its unfolding that the word is realised. This is close to Aquinas’s movement from act to act, 
because the act of understanding generates the act of language. 
This second likeness between the formed inner word and the unchanging divine word is 
once again a point of contention between Augustine and Gadamer, and yet it is this word that 
laid the groundwork for hermeneutics, which recognises that something unfolds in language 
and history. Augustine’s notion of a “true word” is problematic for Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 
Augustine wants to argue that the formed word or concept arrives close to God’s perfection and 
is untainted as such. The knowledge is “a true word concerning a true thing.”206 Augustine’s 
formed word reaches God’s unchanging attribute, when it is not distracted by the sensible 
world. It is in perceiving an eternal truth that we generate a word in its true form and access 
the truth.207 “The bringing forth of the mind is preceded by some desire, by which, through 
seeking and finding that which we wish to know, the offspring, viz. knowledge itself is born.”208 
For Gadamer, in contrast, there is no “true word” or simple presence with knowledge, because 
language is not an object for consumption but is the condition of the possibility of 
understanding. In Gadamer’s thinking, there is no act of understanding without the word that 
speaks it, a point that is denied in Augustine’s “true word” preserved from the mundane world. 
Despite Augustine’s Platonism, Gadamer believes that there is something significant 
about Augustine’s insight that the subject matter is brought to full expression in thinking. Here 
is where we see Augustine inching towards the word as a procession from act to act, all the 
while concealing it. When Augustine says the word becomes itself in expressing itself, he is 
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denying that concepts are formed based upon a consensus of what is universal,209 and he 
unwittingly opens the way for us to see that the subject matter is brought to expression in 
thinking. Essentially what Augustine’s word is pointing towards is that the word is not simply a 
“reflection of the truth of things,”210 but an unfolding of it, in the very act of saying. Gadamer 
refers to this as the process of concept formation: “The process of concept formation is not 
content with viewing concept formation as simply the reflection of the order of things.”211 That 
the word is formed by tossing to and fro in a revolving manner without loss of knowledge 
means that the word is the appearance of the thing, and while it was always already a word, it 
is in the very act of saying and unfolding that the word “becomes what it is.”212   
 
Conclusion 
 
Augustine’s inner word is a pure act of the intellect different than Gadamer’s thesis that all 
thought is historical, as the condition of the possibility of understanding. Yet Augustine turned 
western philosophy towards the remembrance of language, when his contemplation of the 
divine revelation showed him a likeness between the divine word and the human word. In 
Gadamer’s interpretation, Augustine’s recognition that that word is sprung from the site of 
knowledge in the same way that the divine word proceeds from the Father’s intellect in act 
would later lead to the hermeneutical notion of the word as an understanding in saying (act to 
act), rather than a seeing and then saying (potency to act). Augustine did not recognise the 
procession of the word, but he led us there, in substituting the word for the Platonic form, 
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which itself was a recognition that seeing is not a mere cleaving to some abstract form but is an 
utterance of truth. As Arthos argues, Augustine’s inner word is not a mere message that 
mirrors a truth but is a movement open toward God; this movement allows the word to grow 
and increase.213  
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3 
The Incarnate Aspect of the Word 
Thought and Speech in Augustine and Gadamer 
 
A prominent theme of Truth and Method’s verbum interius section, “Language and Verbum,” is 
the identity of thought and speech as accomplished by Christian Incarnation. Gadamer 
underlines the Incarnational character of the word in the first two sentences of the section and 
continues to defend the thesis: “There is, however, an idea that is not Greek which does more 
justice to the being of language . . . This is the Christian idea of incarnation.”214 We would miss 
the significance of Augustine’s verbum interius if we ignore its foundation in the Incarnation, 
because the verbum interius is not merely about the structure of thought. In light of John’s 
prologue in John 1:14, in which the Word became flesh, the doctrine of the verbum interius is 
ultimately about how the word bodies forth from insight and reveals itself through dialogue 
with history, transforming the world as it moves along.  
In this chapter, I will argue that Gadamer turns to the legacy of the verbum interius 
because it brings together the word of thought with the Incarnational idea of word as a 
historical event, fused with the meaning of the culture. I will develop insights from John Arthos 
that the Incarnation gathers the inner word and outer word into a common reality, in which the 
relation is so interdependent that the one would not be possible without the other: the inner 
word provides a historical reservoir of tradition for the outer word, and the outer word 
provides an historical unfolding for the inner word, in a manner analogous to the way in which 
the Son enters history. In short, I will show that Arthos is right that Gadamer turns to the 
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verbum interius because the Incarnation elucidates the phenomenon of language, finding that it 
is the enigma of the word that grants thought the historical embeddedness it needs in order for 
human insight to manifest and grow through history, as a gradual unfolding of truth. 
I will divide this chapter into two sections. In the first section, I will turn to the 
implications of the Incarnation in the relation of thought and speech. In the second section, I 
will discuss the word as central to the task of human understanding that carries us through the 
ages, by bringing in the commentary of Augustinian scholar Edward Morgan. Both of these 
sections are read in light of Augustine’s incarnational analogy in De Trinitate that thought’s 
translation into speech resembles the Incarnation as Word. 
 
The Interdependence of Thought and Speech 
 
Gadamer believes that Augustine and the Christian tradition returns hermeneutics to the 
interdependence of thought and speech, a belief that offers the word as an event of meaning, 
rather than as a sign of transcendent ideas. This is an Incarnational insight. Arthos points out 
that Christ’s Incarnation, his becoming flesh, births meaning into the world in and through the 
particular and in so doing disrupts the reduction of the word to a mere sign.215 Gadamer 
explains, “The uniqueness of the word event introduces the essence of history into western 
thought, brings the phenomenon of language out of its immersion in the ideality of meaning, 
and offers it to philosophical reflection. For, in contrast to the Greek logos, the word is pure 
event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum).”216 Arthos elucidates the meaning of this 
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passage.217 In the Cratylus section in Truth and Method, Gadamer defines “ideality of meaning” 
as the Greek Enlightenment idea that the word serves as a sign of truth, apart from human 
experience and its procession from thought.218 Gadamer writes, “Badges, marks, ciphers, and so 
on have ideality insofar as they are taken as signs – i.e. they are reduced to their referential 
function”219 before continuing, “A word . . . is not an existent thing that one picks up and gives 
an ideality of meaning in order to make another being visible through it.”220 The Incarnation 
suggests that language is an event of truth that is latent with meaning, in its enfolding. Just as 
the Son represents the fullness of God, so also does “the truth of things [reside] in discourse.”221 
The word is not merely that by which we see the thing but that in which we speak the thing. 
The Christian move away from obsession with the “ideality of meaning” is a heuristic 
that reminds us that thought is not an immediate grasp of the real, but that language is a 
process which brings forth insight and ripens things. In speech, an idea will pass back and forth 
that comes to life in the moment. An idea is discussed that is then able to emerge to fruition. 
Gadamer observes, “No one knows in advance what will ‘come out’ of a conversation. 
Understanding . . . is like an event that happens to us.”222  We see this same phenomenon in 
thought: thought always enacts itself through language. All understanding proceeds into a 
word. What this means, for Gadamer, is that the identity thought and speech is not so much 
about speech itself, nor an insistence that every word conceived inwardly is expressed 
outwardly, but more to the point: thought needs language and history in order to exist.  
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Gadamer approaches the temporal nature of word through Augustine’s Incarnation 
analogy. We saw in the last chapter via Arthos that Augustine draws the innermost word of 
thought near the mystery of the divine word: for example, the inner word mirrors the identity 
of “knowing and being” in the godhead, although the inner word is still an imperfect image of 
God.223 In book 15 of De Trinitate, Augustine extends the likeness between the inner word and 
the divine word to show that the outer word that proceeds from thought is representative of 
the divine word becoming flesh. Thought’s translation into speech mirrors the Incarnation of 
God’s Word. “For our word is so made in some way into an articulate sound of the body, by 
assuming that articulate sound by which it may be manifested to men’s senses, as the Word of 
God was made flesh, by assuming that flesh in which itself also might be manifested to men’s 
senses.”224 Just as God’s message reaches us in his becoming flesh, so also it is in the word that 
thought can touch the other, and the other can touch us.  Here is where we once again see that 
Augustine has not quite made the breakthrough to the word as a procession from act to act but 
has led us to it in his forgetfulness. Augustine assumes that one has an inner thought and then 
speaks the word and thus that one sees the real in an immediate sense and then says 
something. Yet his affirmation that thought proceeds into word in the same way as Christ is 
made flesh is a model which leads us to the realisation that speech and discourse shows or says 
thought, in and through time and history.  
Arthos argues that the Incarnation affirms the interdependence of insight and word: the 
word is the manifestation of thought, and thought is enacted through the word. 225 This 
interdependence is an Incarnational insight. Incarnation is both the manifestation of God and 
an event in history. The Word remains within the Father, but his message is realised in his 
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historic unfolding. The event of the Incarnation is repeated in the life of the believer; the 
manifestation of the Word never stops unfolding in history. 226 The phenomenologist Jean-
Louis Chrétien echoes this point: “When my life and my spirit open today to this Word, 
something of this Word is born in me; there is a nativity of meaning, a new dawn of the eternal 
truth, a humble and small Christmas that is nonetheless a real Christmas.”227 As Arthos argues, 
hermeneutics learns from this interaction that insight and word are so interdependent that 
they cannot exist without each other: the word is the manifestation of insight, and insight needs 
the event of the word and the event of the moment in order to express itself.  
 The word is an interaction in a similar way that Gadamer describes a child playing a 
game or actors performing a play.228 In a game, the player participates and is captivated by the 
event of the moment. In an effort to win, the player may begin to anticipate the next moves of 
the game or players; the player is neither in control nor a passive bystander. This is why 
Gadamer says that the played also plays with the player, guiding her and forming her 
responses. Gadamer writes, “Play fulfills its purpose only if the player loses himself in play.”229 
In the same way, human language is an interactive play between thought and word. As Arthos 
would say, in the ongoing circle of understanding, there is an interaction between what has 
been seen and what is still to be seen and between what is thought and what is yet to be 
spoken.230 A conversation will bring forth something, allowing it to come to fruition, without us 
controlling or fully knowing what is happening until an idea breaks through the surface, and we 
proclaim that we have learned something. This is where we see once again that thought and 
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word are so historically dependent: thought is tangibly dependent upon language both to 
manifest itself and to reveal itself on its own terms. 
According to Gadamer, the crux of Augustine’s veer from instrumentalism is that the 
outer word is always already a word.231 It is not simply the case that there is a birth of meaning 
when we speak, but that what is born anew was always already meaning. That we experience 
the world in the event of the moment does not imply that what is born is a new insight. Arthos 
says the following about the Incarnation: “It is precisely that the birth of the son, that is to say, 
of God himself, contradicts the common sense that what is born is new.”232 It is the Incarnation 
that shows Augustine that the inner word is not changed into something new when it is 
spoken: “And so our word becomes an articulate sound, yet is not changed into one; so the 
Word of God became flesh, but far be it from us to say that He was changed into flesh.”233 Just as 
the Son is not lessened in his becoming flesh but remains within God’s being, so also the inner 
word is not changed or distorted in speech. Here is where we see the interdependence that 
Arthos is talking about: human insight is not diminished in the act of speaking, and the outer 
word is a manifestation of the insight already meaningful and full of the culture of the past. We 
observe this manifestation of the already in the act of speaking. When we speak, we seek the 
“right word” so that the right “thing comes into language.”234 The human experience is not 
wordless, which we later name with a sign, but it is in the act of utterance that all that lags 
behind can emerge into being.235 Language is manifestation of the past and an event brought 
about in the moment. The inner word is not distorted in its utterance but rather represents the 
tradition in which insight is embedded. To repeat Arthos, we are in debt to Christian theology 
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for this insight, because the Son is not changed into something new in his becoming narrative, 
yet it is in the Incarnation that the Word reached out to us and made its way to us.236   
The Incarnational insight that the spoken word is a movement without loss develops 
Gadamer’s point that the word is a showing or shinning. Heidegger is relevant again. As we 
discussed in the previous chapter, for Heidegger, the word is a showing, a letting something 
appear. In Heidegger’s words, “by unveiling or veiling, showing brings something to appear, 
lets what appears be apprehended, and enables what is apprehended to be through discussed 
(so that we can act on it).”237 Speech is the light that brings forth the world, allowing something 
to be apprehended. But this showing implies that the spoken word is not a diminution of 
thought. Thought and speech must be unified, otherwise the spoken word would be a distorted 
sign of human insight and not a showing forth. Thus, it matters a great deal that God’s Word is 
not lessened in his becoming flesh, because it paves the way for a hermeneutical understanding 
of the word as a showing forth of insight. This emergence from the already is why Gadamer 
says, “The greater miracle of language lies not in the fact that the Word becomes flesh and 
emerges in external being, but that that which emerges and externalizes itself in utterance is 
always already a word.”238 The spoken word is a showing of the tradition and insight that lies 
beneath it. The word carries the community and the culture of the past, and the “event of 
speech” vibrates the whole of this word “at every point of anticipation and recollection, and in 
every possibility, even that which cannot yet be expressed.”239 The word is a showing forth. 
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Speech as Understanding 
 
Gadamer wrote that Augustine’s contribution to hermeneutics is one in which the word 
proceeds from an act of understanding: “Augustine refers to this [teaching of the inner word] in 
order to bring closer to human thinking the mystery of the Incarnation, where the word 
‘becomes flesh.’ . . . The inner word is not the pattern for the expressed speaking, but the whole 
is a process of its own mysterious structure.”240 The word is not simply a sign of thought but an 
entire movement of understanding. In Augustine’s thinking, it is the engagement of human 
consciousness with the word that enables the mind to move towards an understanding of 
something.  
As always, Gadamer’s relation to Augustine is complex, navigating through Augustine’s 
Platonic inheritance. At many points, Augustine wants to preserve the inner word from the 
flesh, suggesting that the inner word itself does not operate out of language, of sense, of history, 
and of culture, a point of contrast to Gadamer’s word that emerges from language. Augustine 
writes, “for this it is which belongs to no tongue, to wit, of those which are called the tongues of 
nations, of which our Latin tongue is one.”241 Augustine’s inner word is in a sense a word set 
apart, in a similar way that God’s people are set apart from the world, as people both immersed 
in the world as their fundamental way of being, and not of the world, in which they live in 
discord with their environment. Augustine thus argues, in contrast to Gadamer, that the word 
does not operate out of the world, in that the world does not constitute its meaning. Despite 
this distinction between the thinkers, Augustine affirms with Gadamer that the mind produces 
a word when it grasps something. Augustine recognises that humans enter into language in 
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order to clinch an idea in their minds, although that word is preserved in the mind of God and 
thus is untainted. Gadamer and Augustine accord with one another on the point of language 
and human understanding being indivisible, although Gadamer says that thought and language 
operate out of history because all thought is historical, a non-Augustinian assumption.  
Augustine’s entire repertoire can be read as Augustine coming to terms with the role 
that language plays in human understanding. Indeed, Augustine’s most well-read book is the 
Confessions, in which he invokes the form of autobiography in order to write his confession and 
devotion towards God, and thus dialogue and language serve as the medium of his ascent 
towards understanding himself and his relation to God.242 Augustine never stopped 
contemplating the role of language in his intellectual and spiritual journey. Like Plato, the early 
Augustine argued that word and thing are separate, with no intrinsic relation.243 In Contra 
Academicos, for example, Augustine argued that understanding does not emerge in saying but 
from “an inner light of truth” that we “consult.”244 Augustine had failed to remember language 
as not a mere seeing but a revelation of all that comes before it. Late in his career, the on-going 
contemplation of the Trinity leads to a shift in Augustine’s thought.245 Augustine turns to 
contemplate the most mysterious and complex concept that one may ponder, the godhead, and 
in turn, learns that the human word provides a glimpse into this mystery. Augustine makes a 
momentous leap towards hermeneutics when he comes to realise that the word brings forth 
the deepest mysteries of the divine and thus is not strictly a sign but a mode of understanding. 
Gadamer noted: “Augustine’s attempt in his books is to say that the greatest mystery of the 
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Christian proclamation and revelation can nevertheless be made somewhat understandable 
through analogies.”246 It is language that allows Augustine to rise to an understanding of God. 
The entire thesis of De Trinitate centres around Augustine’s search for the imago Dei, 
his access to understanding the triune God, and his subsequent conclusion that it is the word 
that represents this image and thereby his ascent to understanding God. Augustine looks into 
his own soul, the imago Dei, in order to understand the triune God, and he discovers triads 
analogous to God’s word within his mind. These triads are the medium in which he might 
understand the triune God.247 These various analogies, to the degree to which they reflect the 
triune God, are his route to understanding the triune God. What is often missed in Gadamerian 
scholarship, however, but has been brought to attention by Augustinian scholar Edward 
Morgan in his book The Incarnation of the Word: The Theology of Language of Augustine of 
Hippo (2010), is that Augustine finds all the various analogies in his mind as an imperfect and 
deficient description of God, with the exception of the Incarnation analogy.248 Of all the various 
triads in the human soul, and all the various points in which the soul mirrors God, Morgan 
argues that none approaches the likeness to God’s word more than thought’s translation into 
speech, and thus that no other triad lifts Augustine’s soul towards knowledge and 
understanding as much as the analogy of the Incarnation and speech.249 In light of this, I would 
argue that when Gadamer writes in Truth and Method that “this cornerstone of Christian 
thought . . . had to do with the relationship of thought and speech,” he is not just commenting 
upon the identity of thought and word but is making the statement that this identity provides 
us with an understanding of the self and (for the Christian) her relation to God.250  
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Before Augustine’s identification of the imago Dei in De Trinitate, he had already set the 
tone for the hermeneutical significance of language for knowing. Two examples from Morgan 
are relevant.251 In book 7 of De Trinitate, Augustine notes that we invoke language in order to 
articulate the persons of the Trinity: “Why, therefore, do we . . . say three persons [of the 
Trinity] . . . unless it be because we wish some one word to serve for that meaning whereby the 
Trinity is understood, that we might not be altogether silent.”252 As Morgan is quick to highlight 
in Augustine’s text, language allows us to understand the Trinity as three distinct persons and 
not three gods. 253 Language matters: “We say three persons of the same essence, or three 
persons one essence; but we do not say three persons out of the same essence, as we say three 
statues out of the same gold; for it is one thing to be gold, another to be statues.”254 In book 4, in 
our second example, Augustine argues that it is in language that he is able to understand the 
difference between how God exists in his being and how he is manifest to finite, linguistically-
dependent humans.255 Augustine writes that in his being, “the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” are 
“the very same thing, by no temporal motion, above the whole creature, without any interval of 
time and place.”256 When revealed to humankind, however, “The Father, Son and the Holy Spirit 
are separated, and cannot be named at once, and occupy their own proper places separately 
indivisible letters.”257 While our finitude means that speech cannot adequately express God’s 
being, Morgan is apt to point out that our experience of language – and the experience of the 
limits of language – teaches us something about the difference between us and God.258 What 
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this means is that language for Augustine is crucial to our entire mode of understanding. This, 
of course, is also Gadamer’s point: in understanding, we always form concepts or words. 
De Trinitate particularly highlights the interdependence of understanding and language 
when Augustine uncovers the verbum interius as the imago Dei, which represents his ascent to 
understanding. When Augustine sets off to find the image of God in the human person, he is 
interested in how we might understand the Triune God: “by nourishment, our understanding 
might rise gradually to the things divine and transcendent.”259 The operations in the mind form  
an “enigma or glass” that resemble the Trinity, but as Morgan points out, the all-important 
point is not the resemblance as such, but how the enigma will nourish and transform one to 
understand God.260 Augustine explains, “They who see through this glass and in this enigma, as 
it is permitted in this life to see, are not those who behold in their own mind the things which 
we have set in order and pressed upon them; but those who see this as if an image, so as to be 
able to refer to what they see.”261 The important second half of that sentence means that one 
must be able to identify the image of God in her in order to rise to an understanding of God. As 
mentioned above, the various triads that Augustine is able to identify in the human person are 
part of this search to identify the imago Dei, and as Morgan argues, the strength of the triads 
are judged according to how they orient one to know and love God.262 The thematic purpose of 
the analogies is to show that we need to identify the imago Dei in order for understanding of 
God to take place. 
Augustine works through various triads in the human mind before arriving at the 
conclusion that the verbum interius forms the imago Dei that allows him to have a matter of 
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understanding. One of the first triads within the soul that Augustine discusses and has been 
highlighted once again by Morgan is what Augustine coins the inner trinity of intellect, 
memory, and will, because like the three persons of the godhead who are distinct but one 
being, the inner trinity is “not three lives but one life.”263 One could quibble with the strength of 
this metaphor to contest heterodox heresies that Augustine seeks to counter, but this 
overshadows what Morgan points out as the main weakness of the analogy: Augustine believes 
that inner trinity is not the image of God264: “This trinity, then of the mind is not therefore the 
image of God . . . it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. And in 
so doing it is made wise itself.”265 The imago Dei is not the attributes of the intellect, memory, 
and love, but rather, as Morgan points out from Augustine, it is that which mediates the soul 
towards knowledge and love of God that is the imago Dei.266 The imago Dei is that which 
participates in the Verbum Dei. When we are moved to understand, remember, and love God, 
our understanding approaches a kind mirror which resembles divine understanding.267   
A second triad, also identified by Morgan, nuances the former and attempts to find the 
human will as analogous to the Holy Spirit within the Trinity.268 Augustine identifies the human 
will, closely associated with love, as analogous to the Holy Spirit. He writes, “Therefore there 
are three things – he who loves, and that which is loved, and love.”269 Within this triad, one can 
see a trace of the Trinity, because in the godhead, the Father loves, the Son is loved, and the 
Holy Spirit is the love that links both. This triad is mirrored within the human soul, in which 
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love, likened to the Holy Spirit, mediates the mind and its word.270 However, like the inner 
trinity, Augustine concludes that both the human will and human love are not a mirror image to 
the third person of the Trinity. Writing specifically about the human will,271 Augustine writes, “I 
have warned [the reader] . . . that he must not so compare this image thus wrought by the 
Trinity . . . so as to think it in all points like to it, but rather than he should discern in that 
likeness, of whatever sort it be, a great unlikeness also.”272 Gadamer also will echo Augustine’s 
point that there is a great unlikeness between us and God.273 For Morgan, as mentioned above, 
this unlikeness between human love and God partially has to do with the fact that the image of 
God in us must move us to love and understand God and thus love itself cannot be that 
image.274 Morgan cites Augustine: “The image of God in the Mind is renewed until the likeness 
of God is perfected in its blessedness . . . He, then, who is day by day renewed by making 
progress in the knowledge of God . . . transfers his love from things temporal to things eternal, 
from things visible to things intelligible, from things carnal to things spiritual.”275 Perhaps it is 
more accurate to say that it is in our weakness and unlikeness that we become more like God’s 
image, but at any rate, Morgan’s point being that we are being renewed into God’s image 
through love of God and thus the image is more than love. We are left with the question: what is 
this image that is renewed and transformed more into this likeness? 
I would contend that the answer first appears in book 8 when Augustine asks the subtle 
question: “But who loves what he does not know?”276 Augustine assumes that there is 
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something within us that moves us to love what we do not yet know, otherwise we would not 
grow to love the Triune God. In the previous chapter, we discussed this movement in terms of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical circle. We saw that in the circle of understanding we move from 
part to whole, from things known to things unknown, in effort to understand what we do not 
know. What Augustine suggests is that it is the image of God in us that allows this movement 
from part to whole to take place. The image of God in us is the enigma or glass by which we 
ascend to understanding. “The question is, from what likeness or comparison of known things 
can we believe, in order that we may love God, whom we do not yet know?”277 It is the image of 
God in us that nourishes our belief and love of God and mediates our ascent towards God, and 
this image, Augustine tells us, is the verbum. “The word is the image.”278 It is no insignificant 
matter that the verbum forms the image of God in us, because it brings us to the word as the 
centre of our being and fundamental way of knowing. The word participates in the 
meaningfulness of things. Here is where Augustine is doing hermeneutics: the verbum is the 
very medium that forms our understanding of the self and our relation to God. In Heideggerian 
terms, the word is a kind of self-understanding that is central to how we relate to ourselves and 
our world. 
It is in contemplation of the Trinity that Augustine works himself from the forgetfulness 
of language to the remembrance of language. Arthos’s inner word of “indirect reflection” that 
we discussed in the last chapter involves a kind of forgetfulness of language, as the word is said 
to stand before or outside language. We also saw from Arthos that this analogy of the word of 
indirect reflection is a weak image, because it fails to approach God’s unchangeable attribute as 
act to act and fails to account for meaningful understanding, because the word is too vague for 
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us to yet understand. Augustine is forced to confront human understanding as a weakness that 
must produce a concept by which we understand; the mind must move from a preconceptual 
act of understanding to an act of language. In his ongoing search for a true likeness between 
God’s word and the human word, Augustine turns to the word that speaks thought in a manner 
analogous to God’s word who speaks the Father, one which overturns the Platonic notion that 
the word is insignificant: “For our word is so made in some way into an articulate sound of the 
body, by assuming that articulate sound by which it may be manifested to men’s senses, as the 
Word of God was made flesh, by assuming that flesh in which itself also might be manifested to 
men’s senses.” 279 Unlike the previous analogies, as Morgan argues as one of the main theses of 
his book, Augustine never contests that thought’s translation into speech is the imago Dei.280 It 
is thought’s translation into speech that forms an image of God in us, and this in turn is a glass 
or enigma by which we can see and understand God.281 If we follow this analogy from 
Augustine’s insistence in book 8 that the image of God is that which moves the circle of 
understanding forward, we see that the word is the image that moves us from part to whole, 
from things known to things unknown, from things sensible to things eternal. It is the word 
that passes to and fro and breaks forth in order to conceptualise God and the world. The word 
must speak, a point that Augustine may see as a human weakness, but Gadamer, of course, finds 
at the centre of our hermeneutical being-in-the-world.282 
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Conclusion 
 
The Incarnation analogy is both an explanatory analogy for the interactive nature of thought 
and speech and a defense of the word as central to the task of human understanding. We saw 
from Arthos that Augustine’s analogy and the entire theological belief that underpins it gives us 
a tangible explanation for why thought and speech are so interdependent that neither can exist 
without the other. The enigma of speech allows things to come to fruition, and the inner word 
in turn grants speech a reservoir of meaningful tradition and insight. What makes this 
Incarnation analogy so effective is that it is more than an illustration of thought’s proximity to 
speech. Because it is the central analogy behind what it means to be made in God’s image and 
therefore to one’s understanding of human identity, the analogy is truly a recognition of the 
word as that which breaks forth into conversation, as part of understanding ourselves and our 
relation to God.  
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Conclusion 
 
Gadamer returned to Trinitarian theology throughout his life in order to counter a world that 
had grown increasingly consumed by logical positivism in the aftermath of the Enlightenment. 
In January 2002, two months before his imminent death at the age of 102, Gadamer wrote to 
Andrzej Wiercinski: “I am delighted to know that the conversation between philosophy and 
theology continues, particularly in North America, where the temptation to forsake the 
interpretive task in favor of apparently more profitable research can be almost irresistible.”283 
For Gadamer, theology draws out the deepest mysteries of human interpretation that remain 
irreducible to scientific methodologies, and it was for this reason that he kept returning to 
theology throughout his life. That Christ proceeds from the Father and becomes man without 
loss in divinity is an enigma that challenges our western tendency to severe truth and word 
from history and culture.284 Both the enigma of the Trinity and philosophical hermeneutics 
challenge a metaphysics built upon the truth of things as preserved from the word. Gadamer 
repeatedly mentioned this common ground between philosophy and theology285: “The greatest 
mystery of the Christian proclamation and revelation can nevertheless be made somewhat 
understandable through analogies.”286 It was the analogy of the verbum interius as it lends 
attention to the uncanny ability of language to approach the godhead that reminds 
hermeneutics that the word is connected to the meaningfulness of things.287 The word humbles 
us, because it is more than we can take or imagine, yet it is also somehow connected to the 
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truth of things, which is why the verbum interius both allows us to approach the mystery of the 
Trinity and causes us to confront the weakness of our own rationality.288 
 Part of what Gadamer is saying is that a Trinitarian view of language brings together 
concept, word, and history into one common reality. Philosophies such as substance dualism 
and logical positivism had led to the problematic idea that a concept is formulated or 
understood in a pure act of intellect, separate from the world of mundane reality, of which the 
word denotes. The Christian word collides with this conventional instrumental view of the 
word, because the divine procession reveals the word as a movement from act to act, as 
opposed to potency to act. This movement from act to act means that we do not formulate a 
concept and then transition into the word, but that we understand in and through the word, 
such that the word enlivens the concept, as a manifestation of it, in a similar way that the Son 
reveals the Father’s mind.289 The word which passes through history provides a kind of 
completion of the thing, in the sense that the subject matter is brought to full expression in the 
word.290 The Greeks at times struggled to understand this hermeneutic as much as 
contemporary philosophers, because they were caught in the Platonic idea that words should 
be evaluated upon their ability to mirror truth, much like the twentieth century positivists who 
believed that the word denotes empirical entities. In Gadamer’s reading, Trinitarian theology is 
a counter response to Platonism and the subsequent forgetfulness of language, because the 
model of the Son who proceeds from the Father while remaining within divine intellection 
shows that neither concept nor word is depleted in the act of utterance but grows as part of 
this conversation which we are. The word is similar to what we understand by the concept of 
love. Just as each new child does not deplete one’s love for her firstborn, so also the word that 
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passes through us and allows for human understanding never loses touch with the 
meaningfulness of things but grows the world and brings it forth. 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical interest in the verbum interius is substantially different than 
the Platonism that always lurked around Augustine’s confessions, but this only makes their 
common ground in Trinitarian theology all the more crucial to our understanding of 
hermeneutics.291 According to Augustine’s Platonism, we see the real directly and then only 
later express it in language. For Augustine, the process of thought involves a transition from 
not understanding (potency) to understanding (act), in the sense that we come to see directly, 
without the mediation of prior acts of understanding. In Augustine’s mind, we have a first 
moment of understanding. Gadamer challenges this, arguing that we always already 
understand because we belong to tradition and language. Thus, for Gadamer, the word is a 
procession from act to act. The word draws something already historical in the mind out of 
concealment and into the light, such that the word is a showing or saying of the thing. The word 
speaks the mind and brings the thing to completion in saying. The reason Gadamer underplays 
Augustine’s Platonism is that he wants to argue for the full implications of Augustine’s 
Trinitarian theology, namely that all thought is historical and that we always already 
understand because we speak the meaningfulness of the world. Historically, Augustine’s 
Trinitarian theology is the pivotal point that brings us to this word which speaks the mind. The 
forgetfulness of language that arguably began in Greek Enlightenment is ruptured in that 
moment when the human word is revealed as the imago Dei. The word proceeds from thought 
in a manner analogous to the way in which the Son proceeds from the Father, which means that 
as Aquinas later concludes, the word is not merely an instrument by which we understand but 
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the medium in which we understand, just as the Son is the one in whom the Father 
understands (the Son is eternally begotten).292 In the process of thought, we generate a 
concept, an inner word, in order to understand. Augustine does not take the full step to this 
remembrance, but his Trinitarian theology nearly has him there at the end of his career when 
he wrote De Trinitate. Augustine establishes the remembrance of the word when he substitutes 
the inner word for the Platonic form of things, showing that knowing is not about decoding or 
mirroring an immaterial impression; rather, it is lingual experience that is our fundamental 
way of knowing and being. Augustine’s Platonism is also overturned in his attention to the 
Incarnation as the sight of the imago Dei. It is in the Incarnation that God came to rescue us 
from futility and death and restore us to this image in our inner words, and it is in this way that 
thought’s historical event is a collision point in which human understanding and world emerge. 
Augustine’s theology cannot escape the historical nature of thought, because the Christian 
word is so inherently historical, proceeding from the historically effected mind and speaking 
within history in order to transform life, just as the divine Word transforms the world in his 
manifestation as God in flesh. One can thus easily see why Gadamer turns to Augustine in order 
to argue for hermeneutical circularity. The “act” that proceeds the human word is tradition, and 
Augustine is tradition.  
 The verbum interius provides a counter response to the Enlightenment “problem” of 
historical distance and human prejudices that has been threatening the autonomy of the human 
sciences, in favour of a supposed objective knowing of the natural sciences. In the 
Enlightenment, human interpretation and historical consciousness are considered barriers to 
knowledge, one which we must decode in a zone free of these prejudices in order to see the 
                                                          
292 Aquinas, Commentary of the John, trans. James A Weisheipl. Albany: Magi Books, O.P: 1.1. 
http://dhspriory.org/Thomas/SSJohn, cited in Arthos, 313.  
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things themselves and this in turn, has threatened the value of the human sciences, since the 
truths of the humanities are not verifiable from a technological or mathematical model. The 
importance of the verbum interius for relieving hermeneutics from these pressures is that it 
shows that meaning is here with us and that the word speaks the thing, not in spite of human 
prejudices and historical consciousness but because of it. In order to understand what Gadamer 
is saying, we have to think of the verbum interius on the scale of history. In the formation of its 
concept, the inner word will toss in mind, thinking of this and another, in order to understand a 
unified thing, which breaks through the surface in a moment of understanding.293 A failure to 
understand that the word brings together all this discursivity into a unified concept in the mind 
has arguably led to the severance between thought and word and the subsequent 
instrumentalisation of the word in empiricism. This is because a failure to recognise the unity 
of word and concept creates a disjoint between our present interpretation and the concept 
derived from the past. Gadamer’s point is that a return to the word as a single conception 
returns us to the unity of concept and word and this on a historical scale. Despite the passage of 
time, there remains a sense in which there is only “one word” that we speak. Gadamer writes, 
“It is always one word that we say to one another and that is said to us (theologically, “the” 
Word of God).”294 A film adaption of a Shakespeare drama may differ from the “original” tone of 
its first ever performance in England, but the meaning of the play is still passed through the 
discourse, and we still participate in its meaning when we engage ourselves in the performance 
and allow the performance to play with us and speak itself to us. 295 Historical distance is not a 
barrier to our access to the truth of things but part of its very passage, and the meaningfulness 
of things enacts itself through the play and players. Before we perform a play, the performance 
                                                          
293 Arthos, 300. 
294 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 454. Emphasis is Gadamer’s. 
295 For Gadamer’s discussion on play, see Truth and Method, 103-106. 
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of a play is already full of meaning, and our interpretation is informed by the meaning from 
which it proceeds. When we perform the word, speak the word, or interpret the word, the truth 
or concept of things enfolds before us, in which the world is transformed along the way.  
 The verbum interius confirms Gadamer’s thesis that all thought is historical, as a 
manifestation of that which came before it. Human thought enacts itself through the word, as a 
procession from act to act. Just as the divine word proceeds directly from the Father’s mind, so 
also do acts of language proceed from acts of understanding. We could say that human 
understanding and human language are indivisible. What this direct procession in the mind 
means for finite creatures is that human consciousness is a historical consciousness, because 
the word that makes thought possible has a historical context. Human insights and concepts 
are brought to full expression in tradition and history, and concepts are given life by the word 
that allows the insight to come to fruition.296 The reverse is also true. The word is never 
divorced from the insight from which it proceeds. The word carries tradition, and this historical 
word gathers our thoughts in moments of understanding. All this destablises the positivist and 
rationalist claim of an unbiased, neutral free zone in which the truth of things is severed from 
mundane life and in which concepts are traced to an original, authorial intent free from 
presuppositions. Gadamer’s point is that history and tradition are not barriers that must be 
decoded, because they are the enactment of human understanding.297 The historical nature of 
thought is not to suggest that one should not question one’s presupposition, but it is to say with 
Heidegger that we must enter the hermeneutical circle the right way and acknowledge the 
presuppositions and traditions that make all thought possible so that we can reflect upon our 
historicity. Human interpretation is not a “vicious circle,”298 because truth and meaning are 
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present with us, residing within discourse and the human sciences, as the conversation that we 
are. In an odd sense, the positivists and rationalists are so concerned to find truth free from 
presuppositions that they conceal the truth that is already present with us, in the utterance of 
the word, which is passed through us in the discursivity of human understanding. In response, 
the Christian word as proceeding from thought reminds us that we do not hover above truth as 
our object but are partakers of it. In affirming this, Gadamer says, “the truth of things resides in 
discourse.”299 
 We have seen throughout this thesis that these hermeneutical insights were conceived 
in light of the divine revelation of the Trinity in Scripture. In Gadamer’s interpretation, neither 
the Platonists nor Aristotelians remembered language, and this raises the question of why it 
took Trinitarian theology to bring us to the remembrance of language. Part of the reason that 
the Christian word made a breakthrough to the remembrance of the word is that it is a puzzle 
to Greek metaphysics.300 In Gadamer’s interpretation, it was Greek metaphysics that led the 
Platonists to understand the word as a representation of reality and the Aristotelian’s to 
understand language in terms of concepts based upon a discernment of what is universal, in 
light of common human experiences. In Gadamer’s reading, both schools of thought somehow 
overlooked that the meaningfulness of things is brought to completion in the word, and it took 
the enigma of the Father who knows himself in the act of utterance, as act from act, to awaken 
history to this remembrance. It was in contemplation of the Trinity that the Fathers came to 
realise that the word cannot be a mere mirror of truth, if the Son is the embodiment of the 
Father’s mind, and that concepts cannot be formed merely upon an agreement of what is 
universal, if there is a completion that occurs in uttering the word. The revelation of the Son 
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also “contradicts the common-sense that what is born is new,” thereby opening the means for 
us to understand that the word speaks something already full of meaning.301 The divine Word 
is “strangely different” from the embodiment of the pagan gods in which “becoming is not the 
kind of becoming in which something turns into something else.””302 Because the Trinitarian 
relation entails no loss or change, neither for the Father nor the Son, the Fathers kept returning 
the relation of insight and word, one that fused together truth, thought, and speech. Like the 
Son who speaks divine insight, the inner word is not diminished in the act of utterance. The 
word is a reappearance without depletion of the thing, an expression of something already full 
of meaning, and the event of something historical.303 The inner word is not distorted in its 
utterance but represents the tradition from which all understanding is possible. As we saw 
from Arthos throughout this thesis, this revelation helps us rethink our relation to the world 
and the meaning of things, because it reminds us that concepts enact themselves at that point 
in which history and understanding collide, and that our very being is transposable with the 
word. The question again is why does Trinitarian theology reveals these truths of language, but 
other competing philosophies do not?  If anything is clear, it is that the revelation of the Trinity 
has not just spoken to the Apostles, Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas, but to the whole of 
philosophical hermeneutics, and we are in the legacy of Trinitarianism if we ourselves make 
our way to this remembrance of language.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
301 Ibid., 241. 
302 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 412. 
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